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George W. Bush and the Nature of 
Executive Authority 
THE ROLE OF COURTS IN A TIME OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Michael P. Allen† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that the administration of President 
George W. Bush has consistently asserted a breathtakingly 
broad view of the scope of executive authority under Article II 
of the United States Constitution.  It has seemed at times that 
not a month goes by without some new revelation of a secret 
program unilaterally adopted by the President, ostensibly to 
protect Americans from the threats we face in today’s world.  
From November 2005 through June 2006, the country learned 
that:  (1) pursuant to a presidential order the National Security 
Agency (“NSA”) had been intercepting communications into 
and out of the United States made by citizens and non-citizens 
alike suspected of involvement with terrorist groups;1  (2) the 
NSA, also likely pursuant to a presidential order, had been 
assembling a database of information generated by telephone 
calls made within the United States;2 (3) the Central 
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) was operating secret prisons 
around the world at which an unknown (and unidentified) 
  
 † Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; B.A., 1989 
University of Rochester; J.D., 1992 Columbia University School of Law.  I am grateful 
for comments I received on drafts of this Article presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting 
of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools and at a faculty works-in-progress 
presentation at Stetson University College of Law.  In particular, I thank Richard 
Meyers for his frank comments.  Thanks also to Debbie Allen for helpful suggestions 
(and her support), Stuart Wiseman for research assistance, and the staff of the 
Brooklyn Law Review for their excellent work on this Article.  This Article was 
supported by a generous grant from Stetson University College of Law. 
 1 See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers 
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.  
 2 See, e.g., Leslie Cauley, NSA has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone 
Calls, USA TODAY, May 10, 2006, at A1.   
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group of prisoners was being held;3 and (4) the CIA and the 
Treasury Department have gained access to a massive 
international database of financial transactions, including 
those of Americans.4  
All of these actions were based, at least in part, on a 
claim of unilateral executive power.  And they follow others 
that have been taken in the “war on terror” over the past 
several years, including the President’s claims that he has 
independent constitutional authority to craft a system of 
military commissions to try detained enemy combatants,5 that 
courts lack the authority to review his independent 
determinations of who is an enemy combatant,6 and that the 
executive branch may independently redefine the nature of 
torture.7  
Less noticed, perhaps, is that the Bush administration’s 
assertions of broad executive power have not been limited to 
fighting terrorism.8  For example, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft sought to derail Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act 
through his unilateral interpretation of the Controlled 
  
 3 See, e.g., Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons: Debate 
is Growing Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After 
9/11, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1. 
 4 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. 
to Block Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1; Glenn R. Simpson, Treasury Tracks 
Financial Data in Search Effort, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2006, at A1. 
 5 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006) (rejecting 
claims of unilateral presidential authority to constitute military commissions).  I 
discuss Hamdan in more detail below.  See infra Parts III.A.1 and IV.A.1. 
 6 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533, 535 (2004) (rejecting 
administration’s position that courts lacked authority to consider individualized claims 
that designated enemy combatants were being unlawfully detained); Rasul v. Bush, 
542 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2004) (rejecting administration claims that federal courts lacked 
habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider claims of individuals held at the United States 
facility in Guantanamo, Cuba).  I discuss Hamdi and Rasul in more detail below.  See 
infra Part III.A.1.  
 7 See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., Off. of Legal Counsel, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards 
of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002) (on file with 
author), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/ 
dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf.  For a critical assessment of presidential authority 
in connection with torture, see Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President be Torturer in 
Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1155-67 (2006). 
 8 A few commentators have discussed “domestic” matters in connection with 
the Bush administration’s assertion of executive power.  However, such discussions 
still tend to be focused at base on matters concerning national security.  See, e.g., 
Elizabeth Drew, Power Grab, 53 N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 22, 2006), available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19092.  
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Substances Act.9  In a similar vein, administrative agencies 
have increasingly taken steps to displace state law through 
“executive preemption,” by which federal law’s preemptive 
effect is tied more closely to executive fiat than congressional 
intent.10  And the President has used recess appointments to 
bypass the Senate in areas as diverse as the federal judiciary,11 
the United States Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations,12 and the Board of Trustees for Social Security and 
Medicare.13 
Of course, President Bush is not the first occupant of 
the office to assert a broad conception of executive power.  For 
example, Thomas Jefferson fought the Barbary pirates and 
made the Louisiana Purchase.14  Abraham Lincoln suspended 
the writ of habeas corpus, signed the Emancipation 
Proclamation, and engaged in a wide range of aggressive 
executive action during the Civil War.15  President Franklin 
Roosevelt fought World War II and the depression and along 
  
 9 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 925 (2006) (striking down 
Ashcroft Directive on administrative law grounds).  I return to this case below.  See 
infra Parts III.A.3 and IV.A.2. 
 10 See, e.g., Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA Plan Would Aid Drug Makers in 
Liability Suits, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2006, at A1; Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by 
Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2007).  I discuss executive preemption below.  See infra Part III.A.4. 
 11 See, e.g., Mike Allen, Bush Again Bypasses Senate to Seat Judge, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 21, 2004, at A1.  The Constitution expressly allows the President to fill 
vacancies in appointed positions on a temporary basis.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 
(“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the 
Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their 
next Session.”). 
 12 See, e.g., Jim VandeHei & Colum Lynch, Bush Names Bolton U.N. 
Ambassador in Recess Appointment, WASH. POST, Aug 2, 2005, at A1. 
 13 See, e.g., Robert Pear, Defying Senators, Bush Renames 2 Social Security 
Public Trustees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2006, at A24, available at 2006 WLNR 6593879. 
 14 See, e.g., DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON THE 
PRESIDENT: THE FIRST TERM 1801-1805, at 284-332 (1970) (discussing Louisiana 
Purchase and the expansion of the Union); DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: 
JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 1805-1809, at 35-44 (1974) (discussing 
piracy issues); Noah Feldman, Who Can Check the President?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 52. 
 15 See, e.g., Benjamin A. Kleinerman, Lincoln’s Example: Executive Power 
and the Survival of Constitutionalism, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 801, 805-08 (2005); Michael 
Stokes Paulson, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257, 1264 
(2004); see also generally MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991). 
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the way ushered in the modern administrative state.16  And 
President Clinton fought “wars” in Kosovo and Somalia.17 
Yet the fact that the Bush administration’s effort is not 
unique does not mean that the current debate concerning its 
assertions of power is merely a regurgitation of arguments 
from the past.  First, the modern presidency is a far more 
powerful office than the presidency during much of the 
country’s history.  Presidents Jefferson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt 
simply did not hold in their hands the type of power President 
Bush possesses.  Second, while I have indicated that the 
assertions of presidential power go beyond the “war on terror,” 
the ever-present fear of terrorism (whether real, imagined or 
somewhere in between18) has a significant impact on executive 
power more generally.  For example, President Bush’s reservoir 
of power has been enhanced in the post-9/11 world, making him 
more powerful in some measure than even his closest 
contemporary in office, Bill Clinton.  Indeed, September 11th 
has served as a catalyst (or excuse) for arguments in favor of 
expanding presidential power that might not otherwise have 
been possible.   
In the end, each age is different from others in 
important and often intangible respects.  While one is tempted 
to equate Franklin Roosevelt’s push to expand presidential 
power through the New Deal and in World War II or Abraham 
Lincoln’s efforts in the Civil War with George W. Bush’s 
actions, such transpositions are artificial at best and dangerous 
at worst.19  This is not to say that historical precedents offer 
  
 16 See, e.g., GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE 
INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS 73-124 (2001); Feldman, supra note 14.   
 17 See generally RYAN C. HENDRICKSON, THE CLINTON WARS: THE 
CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, AND WAR POWERS (2002).  
 18 There has been much debate about whether the current fight against 
terrorism is deserving of the moniker “war.”  See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, BEFORE 
THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 13-38 (2006) 
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, NEXT ATTACK] (arguing that terrorism is a tactic and that the 
label “war” is inappropriate); John Yoo, Enemy Combatants and the Problem of 
Judicial Competence, in TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
DEBATING THE ENEMY COMBATANT CASES 69, 71-75 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2005) 
[hereinafter TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR] (arguing that critics of the use of the term 
“war” are misguided); see also Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at 
a Time: A Noncriminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay 
Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 153 n.14 (2005) (collecting sources on the 
debate). 
 19 Professor Ackerman has recently made a similar point in the specific 
context of equating a fight against terrorism with wars in which the survival of the 
Republic was at stake.  See, e.g., ACKERMAN, NEXT ATTACK, supra note 18, at 56 
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nothing in current debates.  Rather, one needs to ensure that 
the past is used as a reference to consider rather than as a 
shackle to bind.   
I wish to be clear about the thesis of this Article.  We 
live in a nation divided deeply along partisan lines.20  To take 
just one example, as the New York Times recently reported on 
its front page:  “No military conflict in modern times has 
divided Americans on partisan lines more than the war in 
Iraq . . . —not even Vietnam.”21  It seems at times that every 
aspect of American life is infected with an “us” versus “them” 
political mentality.  As one political scientist commented:  
“[t]he primary colors of contemporary America seem to be red 
and blue.  On a variety of important political issues, partisan 
and ideological differences are substantial and profound.”22  
Given this state of affairs, it would be understandable if a 
reader saw this Article’s title and wrote it off as another 
installment in the partisan wars.  It is not.   
Rather, the Article explores the serious question of the 
role of courts in a time of actual or potential constitutional 
change.  The change we face in our time happens to concern the 
actions of the federal executive branch under the leadership of 
a Republican President.  But the theoretical underpinning of 
the approach I describe would apply equally to an attempt by 
Congress to broaden its powers, or to the actions of a President 
Hillary Rodham Clinton or a President Barack Obama.  I ask, 
then, that the reader put aside questions of my partisanship—
at least for the moment—and judge the theory on its merits.  If 
those of us in the world of legal academia are unable to do so, 
the nation may be in greater difficulty than is imagined.  What 
is needed instead is a longer-term focus not on this President, 
  
(contrasting the current global fight against terrorism with the threats to “the political 
existence of the United States” in World War II and the Civil War).   
 20 Simply living in America today bears this statement out.  There is also 
support in the political science literature.  See, e.g., Alan Abramowitz & Kyle Saunders, 
Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? The Reality of a Polarized America, 3 FORUM 1 
(2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol3/iss2/art1.   
 21 Robin Toner & Jim Rutenberg, Partisan Divide on Iraq Exceeds Split on 
Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at A1; see also David S. Broder & Dan Balz, How 
Common Ground of 9/11 Gave Way to Partisan Split, WASH. POST, July 16, 2006, at A1 
(discussing the politicization in America occurring after the September 11th terrorist 
attacks along a number of dimensions).  
 22 James L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the United States Supreme Court in a 
Polarized Polity 1 (June 15, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Dep’t of Pol. 
Sci. at Wash. U. in St. Louis), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=909162. 
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but on the presidency as one of many institutions in the 
constitutional structure. 
The jury is still out on the administration’s ultimate 
success in redefining the scope of executive power.  In some 
cases, the courts effectively have supported the 
administration.23  In others, the administration has been 
rebuked.24  In the great majority of situations, a debate still 
rages over the propriety of unilateral presidential authority.25  I 
will not join the debate about the constitutionality of any of the 
specific actions taken by the current administration.  For 
present purposes, I assume merely that the administration’s 
positions are pushing the constitutional envelope in terms of 
presidential power under the Constitution.   
My aim is to explore the role of courts in response to 
such a broad-based and coordinated assertion of envelope-
pushing executive power.  Of course, one obvious response to 
such an inquiry is that the judiciary should follow Chief Justice 
Roberts’s comment during his confirmation hearings:  judges 
are umpires who should call balls and strikes.26  Thus, the 
judiciary’s role is to take each case challenging a given 
executive action on its own and use standard principles of 
constitutional and statutory interpretation to resolve the 
narrow issue presented.  As I explain further below, however, 
such a narrow approach provides insufficient protection for the 
structural underpinnings of American democracy.   
I begin in Part II by laying out a constitutional theory 
that should guide courts when faced with a broad, 
constitutionally envelope-pushing assertion of power by one 
structural part of the American constitutional system.  In brief, 
courts must serve as agents of systemic structural equilibrium.  
  
 23 See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 391-92 (2004) (largely 
rejecting challenges seeking to make public certain records concerning Vice President 
Cheney’s energy task force). 
 24 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006) (rejecting 
claims of unilateral presidential authority to constitute military commissions); 
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 925 (2006) (striking down Ashcroft Directive).  I 
discuss both cases below.  See infra Parts III.A.1 and IV.A.1 (discussing Hamdan); 
Parts III.A.3 and IV.A.2 (discussing Gonzales). 
 25 I discuss some of these debates in Part III below when considering the 
various actions of the Bush administration.  See infra Parts III.A.1-4.   
 26 See Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Why the President’s Defense of 
Executive Power to Wiretap Without Warrants Can’t Succeed in the Strict 
Constructionist Court He Wants, FINDLAW, Feb. 17, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
commentary/20060217_brownstein.html (quoting Chief Justice Roberts at his 
confirmation hearings as saying that “I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and 
strikes, and not to pitch or bat”).  
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The judiciary must ensure that the fundamental structural 
safeguards built into the fabric of the Constitution are 
maintained even if a constitutional change in the balance of 
power is implemented.  The way in which equilibrium is re-
established will vary depending upon the particular change at 
issue, but the goal of maintaining the boundaries of the 
structural safeguards embedded in the Constitution remains 
constant. 
Part II also identifies the fundamental structural 
principles that should guide courts.  The Constitution and the 
documents surrounding its drafting and ratification reveal 
three foundational principles:  (1) The Constitution is based on 
maintaining multiple and meaningful centers of political 
authority situated horizontally and vertically from one another.  
These power centers—the three coordinate branches of the 
federal government and the states—must be capable of 
meaningfully playing their roles in maintaining a separation of 
governing authority; (2) the People must be allowed to have 
meaningful participation in the governing process; and 
(3) whatever power relationships are implemented, the 
resulting governmental structure must be functional.  The goal 
of Part II is to prepare specifically to address how courts should 
respond to the Bush administration’s assertion of executive 
authority.   
Before one is able to do so, one must get a better 
understanding of the Bush administration’s specific conception 
of executive authority.  Part III is a descriptive exercise 
devoted to distilling the single dominant theme and three 
distinct but related sub-attributes of President Bush’s 
constitutional Chief Executive. The dominant and overarching 
theme of the Bush administration’s stance is a strongly 
unilateral executive who is constitutionally empowered to take 
a wide array of actions without “interference” from any other 
power center in American government.  The three distinct sub-
attributes associated with unilateralism are: (1) the unilateral 
authority is often exercised in secret, greatly reducing 
transparency in government (such lack of transparency applies 
to citizens as well as to other institutions of government); 
(2) the administration is highly intolerant of criticism and 
questioning associated with its exercise of power; and (3) the 
administration is disciplinarian and retributive with respect to 
those people and entities that do challenge its exercise of 
authority.   
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Part IV of the Article turns to the specific question of 
the courts and President Bush by applying the theory set out in 
Part II to the description of the Bushian constitutional 
executive laid out in Part III.  In order to do so, I use cases 
considered by the United States Supreme Court during its 
October 2005 Term.  I consider cases in such divergent areas as 
the legality of military commissions,27 federal attempts to 
interfere with state laws providing a limited right to physician-
assisted suicide,28 partisan redistricting,29 campaign finance 
reform,30 and First Amendment protections for public 
employees and citizens alike.31  I explain how these cases, as 
well as some others, fit into the structural equilibrium 
approach.  In some instances the theory produces the same 
results as those actually reached, while in other important 
respects I argue that the Court should have approached 
matters quite differently in order to act as an agent of 
structural equilibrium.   
Finally, Part V concludes by considering issues on the 
horizon in which courts will again have the opportunity to 
respond to the Bush vision of Article II.  It is not hyperbole to 
suggest that what happens in the next few years will decide in 
many respects the type of government enjoyed by our children 
and grandchildren.  The stakes are unquestionably high. 
II. COURTS AS AGENTS OF STRUCTURAL EQUILIBRIUM 
Before it is possible to address how courts should 
respond specifically to President Bush’s assertions of executive 
authority, one must consider the constitutional landscape.  
This Part explores the constitutional theory on which my 
discussion of the Bush administration and this past Term of 
the Supreme Court is based.  I first briefly discuss the 
legitimacy of constitutional change outside of a formal 
amendment.32  Thereafter, I describe how courts should 
respond to such change.33 
  
 27 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759. 
 28 Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 904. 
 29 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2605 (2006). 
 30 Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2485 (2006). 
 31 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1951 (2006); Hartman v. Moore, 126 
S. Ct. 1695, 1695 (2006). 
 32 See infra Part II.A.  
 33 See infra Part II.B.  
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A. The Legitimacy of “Extra-Constitutional” Change 
With one exception,34 the Constitution is not immune 
from change.  Article V sets forth a mechanism by which formal 
amendments to the Constitution may be adopted and ratified.  
The process is designed to be difficult and requires coordinated 
and super-majoritarian action of both Houses of Congress and 
state legislatures (or ratifying conventions).35  As a testament 
to the difficulty of the formal process, there have only been 
twenty-seven amendments to the Constitution since it was 
ratified.36 
If one were limited to the text, in the absence of a formal 
amendment there could be no constitutional change.  Under 
this view, a judge’s role in assessing the Bush administration’s 
assertions of executive authority would be to join Chief Justice 
Roberts and play umpire.37  Courts would be limited to 
determining if a given assertion of power was consistent with 
the Constitution’s un-amended text. 
However, powerful arguments have been made 
supporting the theoretical proposition that legitimate 
constitutional change is possible in the absence of a formal 
amendment.38  At its most basic level, one may argue that the 
meaning of the Constitution shifts in a legitimate way simply 
as a result of the interpretation given the text by different 
members of the Supreme Court.  No doubt membership of the 
Supreme Court matters, even in constitutional cases.39  But 
  
 34 The exception is that a state’s representation in the Senate may not be 
altered without its consent.  U.S. CONST. art. V.  The original Constitution precluded 
an amendment for a certain period of time with respect to the importation of slaves.  
Id. 
 35 It is possible under Article V for two-thirds of the states to call for the 
convening of a Constitutional Convention.  Id.  This mode of amendment has never 
been utilized.  
 36 In contrast, as of 1996, there had been over 5,900 amendments to state 
constitutions.  See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 23-24 (1998).  
And the reality is that this number is far greater because it does not take into account 
amendments to early versions of state constitutions.  Id. In this regard, only nineteen 
states still retain the same constitution as was in place when the state joined the 
Union.  Id. 
 37 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
 39 For example, one well-respected observer and practitioner believes that the 
replacement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor with Justice Samuel Alito during the 
October 2005 Term altered the likely result in at least two constitutional cases.  See 
Posting of Tom Goldstein to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/ 
archives/2006/06/25-week (June 27, 2006, 11:20 EST) (arguing that the replacement of 
O’Connor with Alito altered the results in a First Amendment case, Garcetti v. 
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this fact does not necessarily mean that there has been a 
constitutional change.  The great majority of the Constitution’s 
provisions are not black and white.  Instead, they are shades of 
gray in which “interpretation” better explains differing 
outcomes than does “extra-constitutional change.”    
There are, however, more satisfying theories by which 
legitimate changes in constitutional meaning are accomplished 
through something less than a formal Article V amendment.  
Perhaps the most significant of such theories has been 
advanced by Yale Law School Professor Bruce Ackerman.  In 
two influential—and controversial40—works, Professor 
Ackerman articulated a theory in which “We the People” act to 
change the higher law of the Constitution without engaging in 
the constitutionally specified amendment process.41  The result 
of such “constitutional moments” is a redefinition of the 
governing law as if there had been an amendment.42  Other 
commentators have also either suggested means by which the 
Constitution’s meaning could legitimately be altered in ways 
other than formal amendment, or recognized that such 
transformations appear to have taken place.43 
  
Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006), and a Fourth Amendment case, Hudson v. Michigan, 
126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006)). 
 40 Some commentators have generally supported Ackerman’s approach.  See, 
e.g., Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitutional Change (Or, How Many Times 
has the United States Constitution Been Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) >26; (D) All of 
the Above), 8 CONST. COMMENT. 409, 411 n.4 (1991); Mark Tushnet, The Flag-Burning 
Episode: An Essay on the Constitution, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 39, 48-53 (1990); Steven L. 
Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 
1441, 1445 (1990).  Others have been far more critical.  See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, 
Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of 
Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 763-92 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, The 
Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918, 923-28 (1992) (reviewing BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991)); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure 
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. 
L. REV. 1221, 1228-35 (1995). 
 41 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, at 3-33 (1991) 
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS, at 3-31 (1998). 
 42 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 41, at 3-33 (laying out the 
basics of his theory). 
 43 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 1-95 (2003) 
(developing a more evolutionary theory of extra-constitutional change); Jack M. Balkin, 
How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the 
New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 28 (2005) (discussing impact of social 
movements on constitutional meaning); Feldman, supra note 14 (“Constitutional 
evolution, like its counterpart in the natural world, has occurred sometimes gradually 
and sometimes in catastrophic jolts, like those brought about by war or economic 
crisis.”); Stephen M. Griffin, Constituent Power and Constitutional Change in American 
Constitutionalism 19 (Tul. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 06-12, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=928493 (arguing that the Constitution can change outside of 
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This is not the place to join the debate concerning the 
legitimacy of extra-constitutional change.  For present 
purposes, I assume two things in this regard.  First, the 
Constitution may be altered in ways not specified in the 
document.  Second, the administration’s assertion of executive 
power at the very least could qualify as such a legitimate extra-
constitutional change.  My concern is what the courts should do 
in response to such a situation.  I consider this question in the 
abstract in the balance of this Part and then turn to the Bush 
administration’s efforts in particular in Part III.44 
B. The Role of Courts in a Time of Extra-Constitutional 
Change:  Agents of Structural Equilibrium 
In this Part, I develop an approach that courts should 
follow during a time of actual or potential constitutional 
change.  If there is a formal amendment, a court should 
interpret and enforce the amendment.  My focus is on those 
circumstances discussed in the previous sub-part in which 
there is an extra-constitutional change.  It is in such a 
situation that the judiciary plays an essential but quite 
difficult role in the American constitutional order. 
In a nutshell, when confronted with extra-constitutional 
change, courts should act as agents of structural equilibrium.  
They should evaluate the full scope of the change being 
advocated, making sure to consider all the attributes of the 
new constitutional vision.  They should then implement the 
new extra-constitutional order in a manner that best preserves 
the core structural principles on which the foundation of 
American government is based.  I will refer to these principles, 
which I describe in this sub-part, as the “foundational 
principles.”  Thus, the courts should act in a manner that 
implements a legitimate extra-constitutional change but only 
to the extent that the foundational principles are preserved in 
some form.  The precise manner in which they are preserved 
will vary, but they must remain at the core of the 
  
Article V process but disagreeing with Professor Ackerman’s focus on specific 
constitutional moments); Levinson, supra note 40 (generally discussing different ways 
in which constitutional meaning legitimately shifts); James Gray Pope, Republican 
Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 
U. PA. L. REV. 287, 292 (1990) (developing a theory of “Republican moments” in which 
constitutional meaning is altered outside of the amendment process). 
 44 See infra Part IV (applying the structural equilibrium approach to the 
Bushian vision of executive power).  
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constitutional order absent a formal amendment.  It falls to the 
courts to act as the agents of structural equilibrium.45 
The first step is to identify the foundational principles 
that courts must enforce.  These principles are derived from the 
Constitution itself as well as matters surrounding its drafting 
and ratification.  There are three such principles.  They are 
broad, allowing courts facing an extra-constitutional change 
considerable flexibility.  In the balance of this sub-part, I 
describe each foundational principle and highlight some issues 
courts may face when attempting to preserve that principle in 
a time of extra-constitutional change.   
1. Foundational Principle #1:  Maintaining Multiple 
and Meaningful Centers of Political Authority 
The centerpiece of the American constitutional order is 
the existence of multiple centers of political authority that are 
capable of meaningfully checking the accretion of power in any 
one governmental entity.46  These centers are oriented both 
vertically and horizontally to one another.  Thus, we have the 
concepts of federalism, or the relationship between the states 
and the federal government as well as the relationship among 
  
 45 The structural equilibrium approach I describe is similar in some respects 
to approaches advocated by other academic commentators.  For example, writing in 
quite different contexts, both Professor Abner Greene and Professor Neil Kinkopf have 
argued persuasively that when considering aggressive assertions of executive 
authority, courts should be cognizant of the critical role separation of powers plays in 
the American constitutional order.  See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in 
an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 123-28 (1994) (arguing that 
courts should consider structural separation of powers principles in considering the 
operation of administrative agencies); Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in 
Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1169, 1195 (2006) (arguing that when considering presidential war 
powers in an era of complex statutory regimes, courts “should proceed from a fulsome 
understanding of the way in which the Constitution structures government power and 
of the role that each branch is designed to play within that structure.”).  I whole-
heartedly agree with the prescriptions of both Professor Greene and Professor Kinkopf.  
The structural equilibrium approach I discuss here is consistent with, but not identical 
to their suggestions.  In particular, it is both broader and deeper.  It is broader because 
it consciously concerns the full scope of presidential authority, not only one aspect of it 
such as executive lawmaking or war powers.  It is deeper in that it explicitly considers 
structural principles beyond separation of powers.  In the end, however, all three 
approaches are cut from the same constitutional cloth.  See Griffin, supra note 43, at 16 
(commenting that the Constitution “created institutions and structural relationships 
intended to last through history”). 
 46 While there are many theories about the nature of separation of powers 
principles, it is common ground that a core constitutional value concerns the division 
and intertwining of power.  See, e.g., Amar & Brownstein, supra note 26 (describing 
diffusing government power as “Constitutional Law 101”); see generally HAROLD H. 
BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATE (2006). 
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the states themselves, and separation of powers, which denotes 
the relationship between and among the three coordinate 
branches of the federal government.  In the balance of this sub-
part, I discuss each of these aspects of the first foundational 
principle. 
Before doing so, however, it is worth recalling that this 
foundational principle is about more than structure.  Instead, 
the principle is in many respects instrumental; it is a means by 
which citizens’ liberty is protected.47  Thus, when a court acts 
as an agent of structural equilibrium and enforces this first 
foundational principle, it is acting in a liberty-protecting 
manner.  There are certainly dangers of which the courts need 
to be aware (as I discuss in this sub-part), but those dangers 
should not dissuade courts from taking on such an important 
liberty-protecting role.  
a. The States 
The Constitution itself provides strong evidence of the 
importance of the first foundational principle as it relates to 
the states.  The federal government the Constitution 
establishes is one of limited powers.48  The several states 
remain as independent sovereigns in many respects.49  In this 
way, the states are able to provide some counterbalance to 
federal power in those areas in which they retain sovereignty, 
  
 47 The liberty-protecting function of dividing government power is well-
established.  It was a centerpiece of the political philosophy of Montesquieu, an 
important inspiration for the Constitution’s drafters.  See CHARLES DE SECONDAT, 
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 161-62 (Thomas Nugent trans., G. Bell 
and Sons, Ltd. 1914) (1752).  The Framers arguing in favor of ratifying the 
Constitution recognized this point.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 249 (James 
Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).  Academic commentators 
generally agree with this goal of separating government power.  See, e.g., Bruce G. 
Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers, 53 
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2003) (noting that among academic commentators “the dominant 
view holds that these institutional divisions [of government power] were intended to 
serve the ‘negative’ purpose of creating multiple and mutual checks to avoid the 
tyrannical accumulation of power”); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels 
Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 
41 DUKE L. J. 449, 451 (1991) (“By simultaneously dividing power among the three 
branches and institutionalizing methods that allow each branch to check the others, 
the Constitution reduces the likelihood that one faction or interest group that has 
managed to obtain control of one branch will be able to implement its political agenda 
in contravention of the wishes of the people.”). 
 48 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”). 
 49 Id.  
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whether that sovereignty is exclusive or concurrent with 
federal authority.50  It is true that if the federal government 
acts pursuant to its enumerated powers, its action will trump 
those of the states.51  Nevertheless, the states’ continued 
existence as political entities under the Constitution is 
important as an organizing principle. 
The Framers also recognized the importance of the 
states as continued centers of political authority.52  For 
example, Alexander Hamilton argued that “the state 
governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty 
which they before had, and which were not, by [the 
Constitution], exclusively delegated to the United States.”53  
Hamilton was specifically discussing the impact of the new 
federal government’s power to tax,54 but his comment applies 
more generally to the important functions the states play in the 
American system of divided power. 
When faced with constitutional change, courts should be 
mindful of the importance of the states in the constitutional 
order.  The states’ role may ultimately be irrelevant to a 
particular change, but it might also be critical.  At a minimum, 
courts must be aware of the importance of the states as 
  
 50 The Constitution organizes the federal government by reference to the 
states.  For example, both Houses of Congress are based on the continued political 
existence of the states.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cls. 1 & 2 (discussing the 
House of Representatives); id. amend. XVII (discussing the Senate).  This tie to the 
states was even more important in the original document because the state legislatures 
elected senators.  See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.  Moreover, the president was to be chosen 
through an electoral college that was based on the states.  See id. art. II, § 1 (laying out 
the requirements of the electoral college).  And the Constitution was to be formally 
amended only upon the ratification of a certain percentage of state legislatures or 
ratifying conventions.  See id. art. V. 
 51 See id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).  
 52 I am not arguing that we should necessarily be bound by a principle merely 
because the Framers ascribed to it.  Rather, I cite to the Framers in order to 
demonstrate that at the time of the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, 
certain concepts were understood as forming the foundation of the American 
constitutional order.  Thus, the Framers’ understanding reinforces the constitutional 
text. 
 53 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 47, at 155.  See 
also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 39, 45, 46 (James Madison) (discussing the importance of 
states (through their people) in the ratification process and the continued importance 
of states under the Constitution). 
 54 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 
47. 
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independent centers of political authority in order to preserve 
their place in the constitutional order.55 
b. The Federal Government 
The maintenance of separate spheres of political 
authority is most classically seen in the context of separation of 
powers at the federal level.56  Madison’s famous statement 
makes clear the importance the Framers placed on this concept 
when structuring the newly-minted federal government:  “The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and 
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, 
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”57  One can point 
to many other installments in The Federalist making the same 
basic point.58  And, needless to say, the Constitution’s text 
confirms the point.59 
  
 55 I discuss an example of how a court could implement this aspect of the first 
foundational principle below.  See infra Part IV.A.2.  
 56 There has been much debate in the literature as to whether the Court 
should adopt a functional or formalist approach to separation of powers questions.  See, 
e.g., Greene, supra note 45, at 125-26 n.9 (collecting sources in the debate concerning 
whether the proper separation of powers analysis should focus on the functions of the 
particular branches of government or on their formal characteristics).  
 57 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 47, at 249. 
 58 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 47, at 
34 (discussing a fear of an all-powerful executive branch in the context of a standing 
army), NO. 15, at 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Power controled [sic] or abridged is almost 
always the rival and enemy of that power by which it is controled [sic] or abridged.”), 
NO. 48, at 256 (James Madison) (“It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly 
belonging to one of the departments, ought not to be directly and completely 
administered by either of the other departments.  It is equally evident, that neither of 
them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in 
the administration of their respective powers.”), NO. 51, at 267-69 (James Madison) 
(discussing the need to provide incentives for federal branches to check one another).  
See also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 
(1969) (generally discussing importance of separation of powers principles to Framers 
as well as the intellectual foundations of the Revolutionary generation); Greene, supra 
note 45, at 142-48 (discussing evidence from Convention deliberations supporting 
importance of separation of powers).  
 59 In general terms, the fundamental importance of separation of powers 
flows from the basic structuring of the federal government in three coordinate branches 
under the Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III.  One can also discern support for 
foundational principle number one from the various ways in which the powers of the 
branches are intertwined.  A few examples make the point: the President appoints 
federal judges only with the advice and consent of the Senate, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; the 
House of Representatives and the Senate must agree on the content of a bill and such a 
bill can only become law if presented to and signed by the President, id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; 
the President may veto or “disapprove” a bill and return it to the legislature which may 
in turn override the veto.  Id.   
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Accordingly, when faced with an extra-constitutional 
change, courts acting as agents of structural equilibrium must 
be vigilant to protect the foundational principle concerning the 
maintenance of competing horizontal centers of political 
authority.  The ways in which the judiciary acts to preserve 
this foundational principle will vary.  Most obviously, perhaps, 
it will depend on the precise nature of the extra-constitutional 
change at issue.  It is for this reason that it is so important to 
understand the contours of the Bushian vision of executive 
authority, to which I turn in the next principal part.60   
It will also depend on the political climate in which a 
particular extra-constitutional change takes place.  For 
example, two prominent commentators have recently written 
about the overriding importance of political parties in the 
contemporary American constitutional order.61  Professors 
Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes argue that “[i]gnoring the 
reality of parties and fixating on the paper partitions between 
the branches”62 is a dangerous mistake.63  Assuming that they 
are correct, their observations concerning the importance of 
political parties do not mean that the foundational principle I 
have discussed in this section is irrelevant.  Rather, the 
political reality informs the manner in which a court should act 
to preserve the constitutional principle.  That is, when the 
political branches of government are occupied by members of 
the same party, a court may need to make more aggressive 
rulings than it would in a situation of divided government.  I 
return to a specific example below,64 but for present purposes 
the important point is that the mere fact that the world has 
changed—even if dramatically—from the time of the framing 
does not alter the overarching importance of the foundational 
principles. 
There is a significant danger of which courts must be 
aware when seeking to preserve this particular foundational 
principle.  Specifically, judges must be vigilant that they do not 
inadvertently use the power of judicial review in a manner that 
unnecessarily aggrandizes the judicial branch.  Marbury v. 
Madison is shorthand for an awesome power to “say what the 
  
 60 See infra Part III. 
 61 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2312 (2006).  
 62 Id. at 2314.  
 63 Id. at 2314-16. 
 64 See infra Part IV.B.  
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law is” despite the actions of the so-called political branches of 
government.65  If that power is used reflexively whenever the 
courts face an extra-constitutional change, there is a real 
danger that this first foundational principle will be undercut by 
judicial aggrandizement.  This fear does not mean that courts 
should never exercise a strong version of judicial review.  
Rather, courts must factor into their response to a given extra-
constitutional change the potential danger to separation of 
powers principles from judicial review itself. 
2. Foundational Principle #2:  Maintaining Meaningful 
Opportunities for “the People” to be Engaged in 
Government 
The second foundational principle is that “the People” 
maintain meaningful opportunities to be engaged in 
government.66  The Framers made the People’s role in the 
governing process clear in the Constitution itself.  Most 
fundamentally perhaps, and as the Preamble makes clear, it is 
“We the People” who took the important step of forming the 
Constitution.67  This animating role is confirmed in the 
Framers’ writings in support of the Constitution.68  As James 
  
 65 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 66 Other writers have argued for the important role of the People in the 
American constitutional order in a number of ways.  I mentioned Professor Ackerman’s 
theories of the People’s distinctive role in constitutional change above.  See supra notes 
40-42 and accompanying text.  Taking the point even further, Dean Larry Kramer has 
recently argued that the People retain the ultimate power of constitutional 
interpretation.  See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 73 (2004).  I take no position here on Dean 
Kramer’s theory, which has thus far spawned spirited commentary.  See, e.g., Larry 
Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1594, 1594 (2005) (book review); Symposium, Popular Constitutionalism: A Symposium 
on The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
 67 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States . . . .”).  In 
arguing in favor of ratification, some of the Framers indicated that one of the defects of 
the Articles of Confederation was that it was not ratified by the People.  See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 47, at 112. 
 68 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 47, at 1 
(“It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the people of 
this country to decide, by their conduct and example, the important question, whether 
societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from 
reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political 
constitutions, on accident and force.”) (emphasis added), NO. 2, at 5-7 (John Jay) 
(discussing the role of the People in the ratification process), NO. 37, at 181  (James 
Madison) (“The genius of republican liberty, seems to demand on one side, not only that 
all power should be derived from the people; but, that those intrusted with it should be 
kept in dependence on the people, by a short duration of their appointments.), NO. 39, 
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Madison recognized, “[a] dependence on the people is, no doubt, 
the primary control on the government.”69  In addition, 
significant functions of government are entrusted to the People 
under the Constitution.70  And, finally, the Tenth Amendment 
underscores the important role the People retain in a default 
fashion under the constitutional order.71 
All of this is not to say that the People were meant to be 
some kind of supreme authority under the American 
constitutional system.  There are important constitutional 
devices designed to control the “voice of the People.”72  In fact, 
Madison made the People’s limited role clear in Federalist No. 
10, when discussing the difference between a direct democracy 
and the type of Republic enshrined in the Constitution.73  But 
the fact that the People did not retain unlimited power should 
not blind one to the important role that the People did have in 
the governing process.  Thus, courts should consider this 
foundational principle when acting as agents of structural 
equilibrium in a time of extra-constitutional change. 
3. Foundational Principle #3:  Maintaining an Effective, 
Functioning Government 
The final foundational principle is that whatever 
governing structure ultimately emerges from a period of extra-
constitutional change, it must be capable of effectively 
functioning.  In the very first line of The Federalist, Alexander 
Hamilton makes clear that it was the “insufficiency of the 
existing federal government” that caused the Framers to draft 
  
at 196 (James Madison) (discussing the foundation of the Constitution as being built on 
the assent of the people of the states), NO. 51, at 270-71 (James Madison) (recognizing 
the important role of the people in controlling government), NO. 70, at 363 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (stating that one “ingredient” for the “safety” of the republic was “a due 
dependence on the people”).   
 69 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 47, at 269.  
 70 For example, the People of the States elect members of the House of 
Representatives.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.  The People choose the electors to serve 
in the Electoral College.  See id. art. II, § 1. 
 71 Id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.”) (emphasis added). 
 72 For example, Senators were to be elected by the state legislature, id. art. I, 
§ 3, cl. 1, and the President was to be selected through the Electoral College system, id. 
art. II, § 1, cls. 2 & 3. 
 73 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 47, at 46-47.  
Hamilton made a related point later in The Federalist when he argued that the 
Constitution was designed to protect against the influence of factions.  See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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the Constitution.74  It would be counter to this foundational 
principle if a court faced with an extra-constitutional change 
ruled in such a fashion that the resulting constitutional 
structure was incapable of serving as an effective government.  
As John Jay noted when arguing in favor of ratification of the 
Constitution, a government is an “indispensable necessity.”75  
Thus, the judiciary must always remain cognizant of the 
fundamental need to have a functioning governmental 
structure.76 
To summarize, when confronted with a legitimate extra-
constitutional change, courts should act to preserve as best as 
possible the three foundational principles described above.  
They should do so by first evaluating the particular attributes 
of the extra-constitutional change at issue.  They should 
thereafter engage in constitutional interpretation in a manner 
that preserves the foundational principles without 
unnecessarily aggrandizing the power of the judiciary.  The 
next part of this Article lays out the attributes of the assumed 
extra-constitutional change of the Bush administration 
regarding executive power.77  In Part IV, I apply the theory laid 
  
 74 THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 47, at 1.  Many of 
the early installments in The Federalist are focused on the deficiencies in the Articles 
of Confederation.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay), NOS. 15, 16, 21, 22 
(Alexander Hamilton).  
 75 THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay), supra note 47, at 5.  This same 
sentiment is also found elsewhere in The Federalist.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, 
at 3 (Alexander Hamilton) (“the vigor of government is essential to the security of 
liberty”), NO. 23, at 112 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the “necessity of a 
constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed”), NO. 70, at 362-64 
(Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the important elements of executive power necessary 
in the new federal government), NO. 37, at 181 (James Madison) (“Energy in 
government, is essential to that security against external and internal danger, and to 
that prompt and salutary execution of the laws, which enter into the very definition of 
good government.  Stability in government, is essential to national character, and to 
the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of 
the people, which are among the chief blessings of civil society.”), NO. 41, at 207-08  
(James Madison) (explaining the necessity of vesting certain powers in the new federal 
government). 
 76 This is not to say that the effective functioning government must be the 
most efficient form possible.  As Justice Brandeis wrote in dissent many years ago, 
“[t]he doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not 
to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”  Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  Academic commentators 
have also recognized the competing needs of avoiding tyrannical accumulations of 
power and ensuring the existence of a functioning government.  See, e.g., Elena Kagan, 
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2341-44 (2001); Levinson & 
Pildes, supra note 61, at 2337 (collecting sources concerning the proper balance 
between fear of accumulations of power and the need to maintain a functioning 
government). 
 77 See infra Part III.  
890 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:3 
 
out here to the particular extra-constitutional change at issue 
by evaluating several decisions from the October 2005 Term of 
the United States Supreme Court.78 
III. THE NATURE OF BUSHIAN EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 
As described in Part II, in a time of extra-constitutional 
change courts should act as agents of structural equilibrium.  
The precise manner in which courts are to do so will depend on 
the particulars of the given change.  Thus, before it is possible 
to apply the theory to the Bush administration’s broad 
assertions of executive authority, one must have a solid 
understanding of the attributes of the Bushian vision of the 
scope of power under Article II of the Constitution.  This Part 
of the Article explores those attributes. 
As described in detail in the balance of this Part, the 
Bushian vision of executive authority has a single core 
principle with three distinct sub-attributes.  Each of these 
features is discussed separately.  The core principle animating 
the current administration’s conception of presidential 
authority is unilateralism.  Under this principle, the President 
is said to have wide power to undertake action without the 
oversight of or a grant of authority from the other 
constitutional centers of political authority.  As explained 
below, this conception of Article II authority explains a wide 
array of actions of the Bush administration.79 
While unilateralism is the driving force behind the 
administration’s vision of Article II, there are three distinct 
sub-themes as well.  First, there is a strong current of secrecy 
running throughout the President’s unilateral exercise of 
authority.  The resulting lack of transparency in government 
strikes at the core of the foundational principles discussed in 
Part II.80  Second, the administration is intolerant of criticism 
of and questioning about its unilateral exercises of power.  
Such intolerance extends from internal executive branch 
officials, to other government actors, to the media and the 
public at large.81  Finally, the Bush administration is 
  
 78 See infra Part IV.  There is no special reason that I selected the October 
2005 Term.  Any Term would likely have provided fodder for discussion.  In the end, I 
elected to use the October 2005 Term because it was the most recently completed 
session of the Court and it included a number of independently significant decisions.   
 79 See infra Part III.A (discussing unilateralism). 
 80 See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing secrecy and lack of transparency). 
 81 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing intolerance of criticism and questioning). 
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retributive with respect to those who do not agree with its 
policies.82   
Before turning to the specific attributes of the Bushian 
chief executive, two more general points are worth making.  
First, the Bush administration’s assertions of sweeping 
executive authority are not limited to the “war on terror” or 
even foreign affairs more generally.  Because terrorism is such 
a frightening phenomenon and because issues concerning it are 
so widely discussed, it has been easy to lose sight of the broader 
issues of constitutional authority that are at stake.  In the 
sections that follow, I provide examples of both terrorism-
related and non-terrorism-related matters when describing the 
central attributes of the Bush vision of Article II power. 
Second, what follows in this section is primarily 
descriptive.  Much has been and no doubt will be written about 
many of the individual matters I discuss.  However, my goal is 
not to evaluate the constitutionality of any given example of 
the assertion of executive authority.  Rather, I focus on the 
larger picture that is revealed when one considers these 
individual instances collectively.  Further, I assume that, as a 
whole, the Bushian vision of the scope of executive authority is 
at the edge of constitutional legitimacy.  My ultimate goal, to 
which I turn in Part IV, is to consider how the theory I 
described in Part II should be applied to such a constitutionally 
envelope-pushing assertion of presidential power. 
A. Unilateralism 
The core principle underlying the administration’s view 
of executive authority is unilateralism.  The President is said to 
have independent or inherent authority under the Constitution 
to undertake a wide range of actions.83  This authority does not 
  
 82 See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing retributive nature of the Bushian chief 
executive). 
 83 This concept can be seen in statements by the administration.  See, e.g., 
Brief for Respondents at 8, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2006) 
[hereinafter Respondents’ Hamdan Brief] (“[T]he President has the inherent authority 
to convene military commissions to try and punish captured enemy combatants in 
wartime—even in the absence of any statutory authorization.”); Brief for Respondents 
at 13-18, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696 (4th Cir. Mar. 29, 2004) (arguing that the 
President has inherent authority to detain enemy combatants indefinitely, even if such 
individuals are United States citizens).  This concept can also be seen in statements by 
academic defenders of broad, inherent presidential power.  See, e.g., Paulson, supra 
note 15, at 1258 (“[T]he Constitution either creates or recognizes a constitutional law of 
necessity, and appears to charge the President with the primary duty of applying it and 
judging the degree of necessity in the press of circumstances.”); JOHN YOO, THE 
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require the action or acquiescence of other centers of political 
authority under the Constitution.84  Indeed, it appears to be 
largely immune from even meaningful oversight of such other 
centers of authority.85  As this theory was colorfully put by an 
unidentified Republican lobbyist:  “It’s we just want it our way 
and we don’t want to be bothered by talking to other people 
about it.”86   
The constitutionality of such unilateral assertions of 
power is widely debated, placing the core of the Bushian vision 
of executive authority at the frontier of constitutional law.87  At 
its most general level, however, maintaining that the President 
has at least some unilateral authority to act is entirely 
consistent with well-established constitutional law.  Most 
significantly in this regard, over fifty years ago, Justice Robert 
Jackson articulated his now-famous spectrum of presidential 
authority.88  A key attribute of Jackson’s approach is that the 
  
POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 
143-81 (2005) [hereinafter YOO, WAR AND PEACE].   
 84 See, e.g., Respondents’ Hamdan Brief, supra note 83, at 8. 
 85 I explore these themes further in Part III.B.1 (concerning secrecy) and Part 
III.B.2 (concerning intolerance to criticism and questioning). 
 86 Drew, supra note 8. 
 87 There is some academic support for a wide scope of unilateral executive 
authority.  See generally YOO, WAR AND PEACE, supra note 83 (arguing that the 
Constitution provides the President with significant latitude to act unilaterally in 
connection with national security matters); Paulson, supra note 15 (arguing that the 
Constitution recognizes a rule of necessity that effectively empowers the national 
executive to act unilaterally in situations of national peril).  There is also a wide chorus 
of disagreement with the constitutionality of this vision of Article II.  See, e.g., PETER 
IRONS, WAR POWERS: HOW THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY HIJACKED THE CONSTITUTION 2 
(2005); ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: RENEWING 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AFTER WATERGATE (2005); Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Liberties 
and the War on Terrorism, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Civil 
Liberties] (criticizing broad assertions of executive authority in a number of terrorism-
related areas). 
 88 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).  The Court has 
since recognized, in the words of then-Justice Rehnquist, that although it was only a 
concurrence, the Jackson opinion in Youngstown “brings together as much combination 
of analysis and common sense as there is in this area.”  Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654, 661 (1981).  See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006) 
(citing Justice Jackson in Youngstown in connection with assessment of President 
Bush’s authority to constitute military commissions); id. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (stating that “[t]he proper framework for assessing whether Executive 
actions are authorized is the three-part scheme used by Justice Jackson in 
[Youngstown]”).  During his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts appeared to 
agree that Justice Jackson’s Youngstown opinion was the most important one from that 
famous case.  See Adam Liptak, A Quick Focus on the Powers of a President, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 502546 (quoting Roberts as 
testifying that Jackson’s opinion “set the framework for consideration of questions of 
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President had “independent powers” to act when Congress was 
silent and even in some cases when it had spoken in a manner 
inconsistent with the President’s actions.89 
The remarkable feature of the Bush administration’s 
unilateralism, then, is not novelty.  Instead, what is significant 
is its scope.90  As will be apparent from the specific examples 
considered below, Bushian unilateralism implicates two broad 
dimensions.  First, it applies without regard to the “domestic” 
or “foreign” nature of the matter at hand.  Second, Bushian 
unilateralism operates with respect to all of the other centers of 
political authority under the Constitution both vertically and 
horizontally.  Thus, when the courts act in response to the 
Bush vision of executive authority, these two elements of 
unilateralism must be taken into account. 
Given unilateralism’s central role in the Bush vision of 
Article II, this Part describes the administration’s unilateral 
action in some detail.  However, the discussion that follows is 
not intended to comprehensively consider any single issue.  
Instead, my goal is to provide a broad picture of the scope of 
executive authority currently being implemented.  Taken as a 
whole, these examples demonstrate the sweep of the Bushian 
claim to inherent power both in terms of the domestic/foreign 
distinction as well as with respect to all other constitutional 
actors.   
1. Enemy Combatants 
Much of the debate of late over the scope of presidential 
authority unsurprisingly has dealt with terrorism.  An 
important strand in this area concerns the identification and 
handling of “enemy combatants.”91  There is much that has 
  
executive power in times of war and with respect to foreign affairs since it was 
decided”). 
 89 See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (discussing situations in which the 
President acts (1) “in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority” and 
(2) “incompatibl[y] with the expressed or implied will of Congress”). 
 90 See infra Part III.B. 
 91 The very term “enemy combatant” has been the subject of some dispute.  
For example, as Justice O’Connor noted, “the Government has never provided any 
court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such.”  Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004).  Of course, this reluctance to provide even the most 
basic information to another branch of government is itself a recurring aspect of the 
Bushian executive.  I return to this facet below.  See infra Part III.B.  For present 
purposes, I use the definition of “enemy combatant” the Supreme Court cited most 
recently: “an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or 
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 
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been and will be written concerning the many issues associated 
with enemy combatants.92  What I focus on are two illustrations 
of the strong unilateralism that characterize the Bush view of 
executive authority:  (1) determining who should be deemed 
enemy combatants; and (2) deciding how such persons should 
be tried and punished.  As described below, taken together, 
these two illustrations of unilateralism have the effect of 
restricting the involvement of the two competing branches of 
the federal government. 
Beginning with the designation issue, the 
administration has consistently sought to reduce or eliminate 
the role of Article III courts in reviewing the claims of those 
classified as enemy combatants.  For example, President Bush 
argued strenuously that no federal court had the authority 
even to entertain writs of habeas corpus filed by non-United 
States citizens detained at the United States Naval Base in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.93  The administration also argued that 
federal courts lacked authority and competence to review the 
individual process through which the President determined 
that a United States citizen captured in a foreign land was an 
enemy combatant.  As described by the Court, the 
administration argued: 
  
coalition partners.”  Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761 n.1 (quoting Memorandum from 
Deputy Sec’y of Def. Paul Wolfowitz to the Sec’y of the Navy (July 7, 2004)). 
 92 For a sampling of academic commentary concerning enemy combatant 
issues, see generally TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 18; LOUIS FISHER, 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE WAR 
ON TERRORISM 220-52 (2005); Neal K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in 
the Guantanamo Cases, in 2003-2004 CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 49, 55-68 
[hereinafter Katyal, Overreaction]; Benjamin J. Priester, Return of the Great Writ: 
Judicial Review, Due Process, and the Detention of Alleged Terrorists as Enemy 
Combatants, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 39, 61-68 (2005); Yung Tin, The Future Role of Article III 
Courts in the War on Terrorism, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1061, 1072-82 (2005). 
 93 See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents at 13-17, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 
(2004) (No. 03-334).  See also Katyal, Overreaction, supra note 92, at 49 (describing the 
administration’s position in Rasul as believing “that it had the ability to build an 
offshore facility to evade judicial review, do what it wanted at that facility to detainees 
under the auspices of the commander-in-chief power, and keep the entire process 
(including its legal opinions) secret”).  Indeed, it seems that at least one Supreme Court 
Justice believed that it was precisely the executive’s goal to establish a system immune 
from judicial review.  Rasul, 542 U.S. at 497-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today, the 
Court springs a trap on the Executive, subjecting Guantanamo Bay to the oversight of 
the federal courts even though it has never before been thought to be within their 
jurisdiction—and thus making it a foolish place to have housed alien wartime 
detainees.”).  The Bush administration’s position, if accepted, would have totally 
insulated the activities at issue from all judicial oversight because state courts are 
without power to grant writs of habeas corpus with respect to persons held in federal 
custody.  See, e.g., Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1871); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 
506, 523-24 (1858). 
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That further factual exploration [of the particularized enemy 
combatant determination] is unwarranted and inappropriate in light 
of the extraordinary constitutional interests at stake.  Under the 
Government’s most extreme rendition of this argument, “[r]espect for 
separation of powers and the limited institutional capabilities of 
courts in matters of military decision-making in connection with an 
ongoing conflict” ought to eliminate entirely any individual process, 
restricting the courts to investigating only whether legal 
authorization exists for the broader detention scheme . . . .94 
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected both of these strong 
versions of unilateral and insulated exercise of presidential 
authority.95  Nevertheless, taken together the administration’s 
positions in Hamdi and Rasul reflect how executive 
unilateralism can be directed against the judicial branch. 
Bush’s unilateralism can also be seen in connection with 
determining how those designated as enemy combatants were 
to be tried.  This aspect of unilateral action illustrates how the 
federal legislative branch can also be diminished in the 
Bushian constitutional landscape.96  After the terrorist attacks, 
the President took a number of actions by which he created a 
system of military commissions to try enemy combatants.97  The 
details are not particularly important for present purposes.  
  
 94 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 527 (quoting Respondents’ Brief). 
 95 See id. at 509 (“We hold that although Congress authorized the detention 
of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged here, due process demands that a 
citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful 
opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral 
decisionmaker.”); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 (“What is presently at stake is only whether 
the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive’s 
potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of 
wrongdoing.  Answering that question in the affirmative, we reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals and remand these cases for the District Court to consider in the 
first instance the merits of petitioners’ claims.”). 
 96 One could also cite the administration’s position concerning the President’s 
constitutional authority to detain a United States citizen (whether captured abroad or 
in the United States), classify the person as an “enemy combatant,” and detain him or 
her.  The administration argued in Hamdi, concerning a United States citizen detained 
outside the United States, that “no explicit congressional authorization is required [for 
such detention], because the Executive possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant 
to Article II of the Constitution.”  542 U.S. at 516.  The Court did not address this 
argument because a plurality concluded that Congress had, in fact, authorized the 
detention through the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), 115 Stat. 
224, not following 50 U.S.C. § 1541.  Id. at 517-24.  The Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reached the same conclusion concerning the impact of the AUMF in connection 
with the detention of an American citizen captured in the United States.  See Padilla v. 
Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006).  I return 
to the Padilla litigation below.  See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 97 See, e.g., Mil. Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and the Trial 
of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 
2001). 
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What is critical, however, is that the President sought to “go it 
alone” by asserting that he had the inherent authority to 
constitute military commissions as he saw fit to try enemy 
combatants for offenses the administration itself defined.98  The 
actions of the administration in this regard are a prime 
example of executive unilateralism.99 
To be sure, the administration also argued that 
Congress gave the President such power through the broadly 
worded Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) 
enacted in the wake of the September 11th attacks.100  But 
there is little doubt that the administration sought to use this 
aspect of the enemy combatant issue as one to aggrandize its 
power.  Indeed, both the Republican Chairman and the 
Democratic Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee expressed frustration that the White House 
“rebuffed” their efforts in 2002 to have Congress specifically 
enact legislation concerning the use of military commissions to 
try enemy combatants.101 
The Supreme Court also ultimately rejected the 
administration’s position that Congress had authorized the 
  
 98 See, e.g., Respondents’ Hamdan Brief, supra note 83, at 7-8.  The scope of 
the administration’s position in this regard was recognized by media outlets across the 
ideological spectrum.  See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Justices Bar Guantanamo Tribunals, 
WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006, at A1 (“Administration lawyers contended that the 
constitutional clause designating the president ‘commander in chief of the Army and 
Navy’ should be read expansively, so that the Executive Branch could take virtually 
any steps deemed necessary for national security.”); Editorial, Wanted: A System of 
Justice; If U.S. Forces Captured Osama Bin Laden Tomorrow, How and Where Would 
He be Tried?, WASH. POST, June 21, 2006, at A20 (“The White House wished not merely 
to conduct trials but also to emphasize the president’s power to do it on his own.  
Consequently, the executive branch alone has defined the offenses to be tried by 
commission and it alone has written the trial rules, which have shifted repeatedly.  The 
legality of the system has been in doubt from its inception.”). 
 99 Unilateralism is also apparent from certain procedures utilized for the 
military tribunals which could be “change[d] midtrial, at the whim of the Executive.”  
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797 n. 65 (2006). 
 100 See, e.g., Respondents’ Hamdan Brief, supra note 83, at 16-17.  The AUMF 
provided that the President was authorized to “use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed or aided the terrorist attacks . . . in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons.”  Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 
224, 224 (2001). 
 101 See, e.g., Kate Zernike & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Detainee Rights Create a 
Divide on Capital Hill, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 
11849474 (quoting Ranking Member Senator Leahy concerning White House actions in 
2002); Kate Zernike, A Top Senate Republican Is Uncertain on Legislation for Military 
Tribunals for Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2006, at A10, available at 2006 
WLNR 11388078 (quoting Chairman Senator Specter concerning the same issue). 
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President’s creation of the military commissions at issue.102  
That decision is certainly important for any number of 
reasons.103  Critical here, however, is the point that the enemy 
combatant saga reflects the Bush administration’s strong 
commitment to executive unilateralism.104 
2. “Domestic” or “Terrorist” Surveillance Programs 
A second example of executive unilateralism concerns 
various efforts to collect information at home and abroad 
related to terrorist threats.  These actions include collecting 
financial information associated with international fund 
transfers,105 assembling data from phone companies concerning 
telephone calls made in the United States (so-called “data-
mining”),106 and eavesdropping on a limited number of 
telephone calls made to and from this country.107  There has 
been much debate concerning the legality of these various 
intelligence activities.108  But their general legality is not the 
issue here.109 
  
 102 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2772-98.  The Court left unresolved whether the 
President had inherent authority to constitute military commissions without 
congressional approval in times of “controlling necessity.”  Id. at 2774. 
 103 I return to Hamdan below.  See infra Part IV.A.1.  
 104 Another example of such enemy combatant unilateralism concerns the 
initial decision whether to place detainees into the criminal justice system or keep 
them in military custody.  If the executive branch has the unilateral and unconstrained 
decision on which path a person will travel, that branch has the authority to determine 
whether the other branches will be involved at all.  A person in a criminal proceeding 
will be subject to the protections of the judicial branch in connection with an alleged 
crime defined by statutes Congress has enacted.  As the arguments associated with 
Hamdan and Hamdi/Rasul illustrate, a person tried in military custody under the 
strong unilateral conception of executive power would not be subject to judicial review 
(or at least meaningful review) and would be subject to offenses defined by the 
executive itself.  Litigation concerning Jose Padilla illustrates many of these points.  I 
discuss that situation below.  See infra Part IV.A.3.  For a general discussion of the 
issue of military detention and prosecutions for terrorism, see Tung Yin, Coercion and 
Terrorism Prosecutions in the Shadow of Military Detention, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1255. 
 105 See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 4; Simpson, supra note 4. 
 106 See Cauley, supra note 2. 
 107 See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1. 
 108 For a sampling of the debate, see THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, TERRORIST 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE CONSTITUTION 32 (2006), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/ 
pdf/terroristsurveillance.pdf (discussing warrantless wiretapping and concluding that 
it is lawful); Editorial, Abolish FISA, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2006, at A12 (arguing that 
the surveillance program is constitutional and that the true issue is that Congress has 
attempted to impede the President’s exercise of his constitutional power); Editorial, 
Bank Surveillance, WASH. POST, June 24, 2006, at A20 (arguing that the 
administration’s gathering of information concerning international wire transfers was 
lawful); Charlie Savage, Views Are Mixed on Domestic Spying, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 
2006, at A2 (collecting divergent views concerning the legality of warrantless 
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The various intelligence activities that have come to 
light in recent months are noteworthy for their common theme 
of unilateral executive power.  Across the board, the President 
has argued that he has the authority under the Constitution to 
engage in the various activities at issue.  So, for example, when 
seeking information concerning international financial 
transactions, administrative subpoenas were used instead of 
investigative tools requiring judicial oversight.110  And in 
connection with the interception of phone calls into and out of 
the United States, as well as the collection of data concerning 
calls within the country, the administration has steadfastly 
asserted that the President has the independent constitutional 
authority to act.111  Perhaps a bit hyperbolically in this regard, 
the District Judge who struck down the National Security 
Agency’s warrantless wiretapping program stated: 
  
wiretapping program); Memorandum from the Cong. Res. Serv., Presidential Authority 
to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence 
Information (Jan. 5, 2006), available at http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/NSA/ 
nsa_research_ memo.pdf (concluding that there is insufficient information available to 
the public to make a determination as to the legality of the surveillance, but casting 
some doubt on the lawfulness of the program); Michael C. Dorf, What Are the “Inherent” 
Powers of the President?  How the Bush Administration Has Mistaken Default Rules for 
Exclusive Rights, FINDLAW, Feb. 13, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw. 
com/dorf/20060213.html (concluding that warrantless wiretapping, at least as 
currently structured, is unlawful). 
 109 As of the writing of this Article, one United States District Court Judge 
has reached the merits of a lawsuit challenging the legality of the President’s 
warrantless wiretapping program.  On August 17, 2006, Judge Anna Diggs Taylor 
granted plaintiffs in the case before her a preliminary injunction against the continued 
operation of the program.  See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. 
Serv., 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006).  Judge Taylor concluded that the 
program violated a host of constitutional and statutory provisions including “the APA 
[Administrative Procedures Act]; the Separation of Powers doctrine; [and] the First and 
Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution.”  Id. at 782.  The ultimate 
impact of this decision remains in doubt.  The injunctive order is currently stayed by 
agreement of the parties pending the government’s nearly certain appeal.  See Press 
Release, Dep’t of Just., Statement from the Department of Justice on Yesterday’s 
Ruling on the Terrorist Surveillance Program (Aug. 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_550.html.  
 110 See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 4. 
 111 To be sure, as with issues concerning enemy combatants, the President has 
also asserted that the AUMF provides authority for his actions.  See, e.g., DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006), reprinted in 81 IND. L.J. 1374, 1396-
1401 (2006) [hereinafter DOJ WHITE PAPER] (arguing that the AUMF authorized the 
warrantless surveillance at issue); Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., to Chairpeople and Ranking Members of the Intelligence Comms. of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate (Dec. 22, 2005), reprinted in 81 IND. L.J. 1360, 1361-62 
(2006) [hereinafter Moschella Letter] (same).  Yet, the “inherent power” arguments are 
always present.  See, e.g., DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra, at 1379-90 (arguing that the 
President has the “inherent authority” to conduct the warrantless surveillance at 
issue); Moschella Letter, supra, at 1360-61 (same). 
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The Government appears to argue here that, pursuant to the 
penumbra of Constitutional language in Article II, and particularly 
because the President is designated Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy, he has been granted the inherent power to violate 
not only the laws of the Congress but the First and Fourth 
Amendments of the Constitution, itself.112 
Whatever the merits of this description of the breadth of the 
government’s argument, there is no question that the various 
intelligence collection activities undertaken in the context of 
the “war on terror” are yet another example of the Bush 
administration’s strong commitment to executive 
unilateralism. 
3. The Ashcroft Directive 
The Bush administration’s executive unilateralism is 
most apparent in the “war on terror.”  However, it is by no 
means so limited.  This point is driven home by an action taken 
by United States Attorney General John Ashcroft less than two 
months after the September 11th terrorist attacks but which 
had nothing to do with that event.  This sub-part uses that 
action to further illustrate the scope of the current assertions of 
executive power with which the courts must deal. 
Acting pursuant to a citizen-approved initiative, the 
Oregon legislature enacted the Death with Dignity Act.113  That 
statute allowed a narrow and specifically defined group of 
citizens to have the assistance of a doctor in ending their lives 
by prescription of certain highly regulated drugs in amounts 
sufficient to bring about the patient’s death.114  Over the years 
since its passage, relatively few people each year have taken 
advantage of the option made possible by the Act.115 
On November 9, 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft issued 
a document entitled Dispensing of Controlled Substances to 
Assist Suicide, which has since come to be known as the 
  
 112 Am. Civil Liberties Union, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 780. 
 113 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.805 (West 2003).  
 114 Id.  
 115 The Oregon Department of Human Services prepares a report each year 
detailing the operation of the Death with Dignity Act.  The 2005 report states that the 
number of persons obtaining lethal doses of medication under the Act’s terms were: 
2005 (64); 2004 (60); 2003 (68); 2002 (58); 2001 (44); 2000 (39); 1999 (33); and 1998 (24).  
See DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION AND EPIDEMIOLOGY, 
EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT (Mar. 9, 2006), 
available at http://oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/doc/year8.pdf. 
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“Ashcroft Directive.”116  As the Supreme Court later described, 
the Ashcroft Directive “determines that using controlled 
substances to assist suicide is not a legitimate medical practice 
and that dispensing or prescribing them for this purpose is 
unlawful under” the federal Controlled Substances Act.117  The 
Directive maintained that assisted suicide served no 
“legitimate medical purpose” under the Controlled Substances 
Act and, therefore, any doctor prescribing drugs under the 
Oregon statute (as well any pharmacist filling prescriptions) 
was subject to license revocation.118  The result, of course, was 
that the Ashcroft Directive made the Oregon Death with 
Dignity Act effectively a dead-letter. 
The debate concerning physician assisted suicide is wide 
and deep.119  One might criticize the federal government for 
stepping into the debate at all, but that is not the point I wish 
to make concerning the Ashcroft Directive.  The feature of that 
action that is remarkable here is that the Directive is an 
entirely domestic example of the Bush Administration’s 
executive unilateralism.  As the Supreme Court ultimately held 
in striking the Ashcroft Directive down as beyond that 
executive official’s power: 
The Government, in the end, maintains that the prescription 
requirement delegates to a single Executive officer the power to 
effect a radical shift of authority from the States to the Federal 
Government to define general standards of medical practice in every 
locality.  The text and structure of the [Controlled Substances Act] 
show that Congress did not have this far-reaching intent to alter the 
federal-state balance and the congressional role in maintaining it.120 
  
 116 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (Nov. 9, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1306).  
The document is widely referred to as the “Ashcroft Directive.”  See, e.g., Warren 
Richey & Linda Feldman, High Court Allows Physician-Assisted Suicide, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 18, 2006, at 1; Liz Holloran, Of Life and Death, U.S. NEWS AND 
WORLD REPORT, Oct. 10, 2005, at 31; Michael McGough, Oregon Statute Upheld: The 
Terminally Ill Can Get Drugs from Doctors to End Lives, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 18, 
2006, at A-1; Editorial, The Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at 26. 
 117 Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 911 (2006).  
 118 66 Fed. Reg. at 56,608. 
 119 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-19 (1997) (discussing 
ethical, moral and legal debates concerning physician-assisted suicide in the United 
States and elsewhere).  
 120 Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 925.  I also discuss this case below.  See infra Part 
IV.A.2. 
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4. Executive Preemption 
Preemption is a familiar concept.  The Supremacy 
Clause121 mandates that federal law will displace inconsistent 
state law.122  Thus, when Congress acts pursuant to an 
enumerated power in a manner inconsistent with state law, the 
state law loses its force.123  The same is true, regardless of 
inconsistency, if Congress expressly states that it intends 
federal law to displace state law.124  Preemption can also occur 
when federal law has occupied the relevant field,125 or when 
state law acts as an obstacle to achieving a federal purpose.126  
Common to all of these paths to preemption is congressional 
intent.127 
There is much one could debate about preemption.  I 
leave those more general debates aside.  Instead, I wish to 
highlight a species of preemption that is apparently largely 
divorced from the traditional focus on congressional intent.  
Specifically, and in keeping with its unilateral exertions of 
executive authority, the Bush administration has undertaken a 
number of initiatives that one could term executive 
preemption.  That is, executive agencies have issued 
regulations and the like purporting to displace state law when 
it is not clear by any means that Congress intended that such 
preemption take place. 
A prime example of such executive preemption is certain 
recent action of the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).  In 
January 2006, the FDA issued guidelines concerning drug 
labeling.128  The preamble to those guidelines stated in part 
that “FDA approval of labeling . . . preempts conflicting or 
contrary State law.”129  Thus, assuming the preemption 
assertion is upheld, state tort lawsuits concerning failure to 
warn consumers of dangers of drugs would be displaced by 
  
 121 See U.S. CONST. art. IV.  
 122 For a general discussion of preemption, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, § 5.2, 392-419 (3d ed. 2006).  
 123 See, e.g., Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 
(1963).  
 124 See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).  
 125 See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).  
 126 See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  
 127 See, e.g., Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985).  
 128 See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human 
Prescription Drug Biological Products, 21 C.F.R. §§ 201, 314, 601 (2006); 71 Fed. Reg. 
3922, 3934-36 (Jan. 24, 2006).  
 129 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934. 
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executive agency action so long as a drug manufacturer 
complied with federal executive agency standards.130  Similar 
examples can also be found in actions of a number of other 
federal agencies including the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission,131 the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration,132 the Office of Thrift Supervision,133 and the 
Comptroller of the Currency.134 
The impact of such executive preemption is two-fold in 
terms of the foundational principles.135  First, by acting in such 
a unilateral manner, the executive branch is usurping and 
perhaps even defying Congress.  In this respect, the 
maintenance of horizontal centers of political authority is 
undermined.  Second, the immediate impact of executive 
preemption is a transfer of power from the states.  Thus, this 
unilateral governing action also serves to undermine vertical 
centers of political authority. 
  
  
 130 Various newspapers reported on the FDA action.  See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, 
FDA Tries to Limit Drug Suits in State Courts, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2006, at A2; 
Stephen Labaton, ‘Silent Tort Reform’ Is Overriding States’ Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
10, 2006, at C5, available at 2006 WLNR 4023298; Mathews, supra note 10.  
 131 The Consumer Product Safety Commission adopted a rule preempting 
state law concerning mattress fire safety.  See Final Rule: Standard for the 
Flammability of Mattresses and Mattress Pads, 16 C.F.R. § 1632 (2006).  See also 
Labaton, supra note 130 (discussing this rule and noting that it “was the first instance 
in the agency’s 33-year history of the commission’s voting to limit the ability of 
consumers to bring cases in state courts”). 
 132 See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 49 
C.F.R. § 571 (2006).  See also Mathews, supra note 10 (discussing this rule). 
 133 See Labaton, supra note 130 (discussing actions of the Office of Thrift 
Supervision challenging on preemption grounds a law adopted by a Maryland suburb 
concerning discriminatory lending practices). 
 134 See Mathews, supra note 10 (discussing regulations promulgated by the 
Comptroller of the Currency concerning state regulation of national banks).  I return to 
this issue briefly in Part V below. 
 135 Several academic commentators have also begun to discuss the complex 
issues involved in executive preemption.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA 
Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to 
Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT LAW, Dec. 2006, available at http://www.bepress.com/jtl/ 
vol1/iss1/art5; Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the 
Administrative State, 1 J. TORT LAW, Dec. 2006, available at http://www.bepress.com/ 
jtl/vol1/iss1/art4; Sharkey, supra note 10; David C. Vladeck, Preemption and 
Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95, 122-26 (2005); Mary J. Davis, Discovering the 
Boundaries: Federal Preemption of Prescription Drug Labeling Product Liability 
Actions (2006) (ExpressO Preprint Series, Working Paper No. 1252), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1252.  
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B. The Sub-Attributes of Bushian Unilateralism  
The previous sub-part described the core attribute of the 
Bushian vision of authority under Article II:  unilateralism.  
The commitment to unilateral power is broad and is not 
confined to the “war on terror.”  Accordingly, a court 
responding to such an enveloping-pushing interpretation of the 
Constitution will need to take an equally broad-spectrum view.  
But before turning to an illustration of how that might be done, 
this sub-part details the three sub-attributes of the Bush 
assertion of unilateral executive power: secrecy and a lack of 
transparency; intolerance to criticism and questioning; and 
retribution. 
1. Secrecy and a Lack of Transparency 
The first sub-attribute of the Bush administration’s 
unilateralism is secrecy.  In matters both foreign and domestic, 
the administration often exercises its unilateral authority 
behind closed doors.  Such actions extend to both the People at 
large as well as other government institutions.  This lack of 
transparency cuts to the heart of all of the foundational 
principles.136  It hampers the ability of other political centers of 
authority to act as meaningful checks on the federal executive 
branch.  It makes it more difficult, if not impossible, for the 
People to engage in the governing process in a meaningful way.  
Finally, it makes government less efficient in the long-run by 
undermining political accountability and ultimately leading to 
unnecessary delay in reaching final, constitutionally acceptable 
resolutions of issues.137 
A few examples suffice to show the secrecy with respect 
to the public.  Before doing so, however, it is important to make 
clear that criticizing the Bush administration’s secrecy is not 
  
 136 See supra Part II.B (discussing the three foundational principles).  It is 
true that Alexander Hamilton specifically noted the ability of the executive to act in 
secret as an advantage of the constitutional structure.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 47.  However, he did so in the context of the overall 
constitutional separation of powers.  See supra Part II.B (discussing separation of 
powers issues generally). 
 137 For example, if the Bush administration had not been as secretive about its 
handling of matters concerning trying enemy combatants, see supra Part III.A.1 
(discussing enemy combatant issues), it is likely that the President and Congress 
would have been able to resolve many matters years ago.  Instead, as of this writing, 
the country is still in limbo concerning such basic matters as how we will try the 
hundreds of people that the United States continues to hold.  The one certainty about 
this set of events is that it is not an effective way to operate a government. 
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equivalent to a call that all government operations be discussed 
in public.  There are, of course, valid national security concerns 
requiring stealth by their very nature.  But such recognition 
should not be used as a cover to justify the wide range of 
secrecy at issue.138  Thus, the “war on terror” does not support 
secretly removing decades-old documents from the National 
Archives,139 or the reclassification as secret of information such 
as the number of ballistic missile launchers the United States 
possessed over thirty years ago.140  Nor does it support the 
government’s attempt to obtain twenty years of records from 
the estate of former investigative reporter Jack Anderson.141  
And terrorism has no application to secrecy shrouding the 
development of domestic energy policy.142  In sum, the wide-
ranging secrecy of the Bush administration has hampered the 
ability of the People to carry out their role in the constitutional 
order.   
In addition, this secrecy has extended to the other 
coordinate branches of the federal government.  This 
phenomenon perhaps is best illustrated by the administration’s 
approach to providing information to Congress in connection 
with the various surveillance programs it has implemented in 
the wake of September 11th.143  It is true that the 
  
 138 Professor Chemerinsky has made a similar point.  See Chemerinsky, Civil 
Liberties, supra note 87, at 8-14. 
 139 See Christopher Lee, The Amateur Sleuth who Gave the Archives a Red 
Face, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at A21; Scott Shane, National Archives Pact Let C.I.A. 
Withdraw Public Documents, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2006, at A16, available at 2006 
WLNR 6449263. 
 140 See Christopher Lee, Cold War Missiles Target of Blackout, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 21, 2006, at A1.  Needless to say, this type of so-called “silly secrecy” has 
prompted critical commentary.  See, e.g., Editorial, A Fixation with Secrecy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2006, at A14, available at 2006 WLNR 14867096.  
 141 See Laurie Kellman, Senate Judiciary Committee Wants Answers About 
FBI Probe of Columnist Jack Anderson, ASSOC. PRESS, June 6, 2006, available at 
http://senate-judiciary-committee-news.newslib.com/story/6709-3203592/. 
 142 The Supreme Court upheld the secrecy surrounding the Cheney Energy 
Taskforce.  See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 391 (2004).  Whatever the 
merits of that decision, the structural equilibrium theory outlined in this Article would 
suggest that the Court should have more actively considered the total nature of the 
Bush administration’s vision of executive power when ruling on the narrow issue 
presented.  Doing so would likely have led to a different outcome.  
 143 I discussed these programs above.  See supra Part III.A.2.  At least one 
academic commentator has suggested that the government’s secrecy surrounding 
terrorism issues generally has contributed to the problems it has faced in the courts on 
its various programs.  See Katyal, Overreaction, supra note 92, at 49.  If this is in fact 
the case, such a “backlash” is consistent with the structural equilibrium approach 
because it uses a broader view of the executive’s attempts to obtain power in order to 
answer narrower questions.  
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administration did not keep all of Congress in the dark 
concerning the various intelligence gathering programs.  But it 
elected to inform only the so-called “Gang of Eight”—the 
majority and minority leaders in the Senate and House and the 
Chairpersons and Ranking Members of the House and Senate 
Intelligence Committees.144  Such limited notifications are rare, 
and questionable in the circumstances presented by the 
intelligence operations at use here.145  Moreover, it appears that 
there are additional secret intelligence programs about which 
the administration has not informed even the Gang of Eight.146  
By depriving Congress of information concerning even the 
existence of certain programs, or limiting such information to 
only eight of five hundred thirty-five members, the Executive is 
effectively able to excise from government one of the 
constitutionally counterbalancing centers of political 
authority.147  Thus, the lack of transparency is an important 
attribute of the Bush administration’s unilateralism. 
  
 144 See Charles Babington, Congressional Probe of NSA Spying Is in Doubt, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2006, at A3 (reporting that only the gang of eight were briefed on 
the program before it was made public); Elaine Cassel, The Congressional Research 
Service and Constitutional Law Scholars Weigh in on President Bush’s Authorization of 
Warrantless Surveillance: Why This Controversy Bridges the Partisan Divide, at Least 
Among Experts, FINDLAW, Jan. 12, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/cassel/ 
20060112.html; Drew, supra note 8 (reporting on limited nature of consultations).   
 145 See Memorandum from the Cong. Res. Serv., Statutory Procedures Under 
Which Congress Is to Be Informed of U.S. Intelligence Activities, Including Covert 
Actions, (Jan. 18, 2006), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/ 
crs11806.pdf (generally describing the statutory requirements concerning 
congressional notification and raising questions concerning the propriety of the limited 
notification at issue in the administration’s warrantless wiretapping program).  
 146 House Intelligence Committee Chairperson Peter Hoekstra complained to 
the administration in May of its failure to brief him concerning an as yet undisclosed 
intelligence operation.  See Charles Babington, Bush Pressed on Reporting Domestic 
Surveillance, WASH. POST, July 9, 2006, at A6, available at 2006 WLNR 11806805.  The 
Chairperson had learned of the operation from an informant within the executive 
branch.  See id.; Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Congressman Says Program was 
Disclosed by Informant, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2006, at A11, available at 2006 WLNR 
11849279; Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Ally Told Bush Project Secrecy Might Be 
Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2006, at A11, available at 2006 WLNR 11821894.  
 147 Other commentators have made similar points concerning the connection 
between a lack of transparency and an undermining of political accountability.  See, 
e.g., Cornelia Pillard, Unitariness and Myopia: The Executive Branch, Legal Process, 
and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1297, 1303 (2006) (noting that secret government 
decisionmaking creates “a legitimacy gap” concerning the decisions at issue); Heidi 
Kitrosser, Presidential Secrecy and the NSA Spying Controversy, JURIST, Feb. 27, 2006, 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/02/presidential-secrecy-and-nsa-spying.php (“It 
would be antithetical to this careful system [of checks and balances] were the President 
permitted to formulate and to execute secret policies that are immune from public and 
legislative checking.”). 
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A final example of the lack of transparency associated 
with the Bushian vision of executive authority—going both to 
the People and other political centers of authority—concerns 
Presidential signing statements.  While it would appear that 
signing statements—whether legitimate or not—increase 
visibility in government, that is not the case with the 
statements President Bush promulgates.  As described in the 
balance of this sub-part, President Bush’s signing statements 
actually obscure the basis for his actions. 
Signing statements have been used for many years by 
numerous Presidents to explain their views (both political and 
legal) on the legislation they have chosen to sign into law.148  
Yet, despite their historical pedigree, there has been much 
controversy of late concerning President Bush’s particular use 
of this device.  Media reports149 of the use of signing statements 
have led to an American Bar Association report critical of the 
President’s actions.150  There have also been congressional 
hearings on the issue.151  Part of the controversy has focused on 
the frequency of President Bush’s use of the device.  The more 
substantial questions, however, have centered on the substance 
of his signing statements.  In particular, the President has 
often used them to simultaneously sign a bill into law while 
saying that he will not enforce those parts of the law he deems 
unconstitutional. 
The general propriety of signing statements is a difficult 
question.  On one hand, some have argued that they are 
illegitimate because the President has a constitutional 
  
 148 For comprehensive histories of presidential signing statements, see 
PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE 
DIRECT ACTION 199-230 (2002); CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF 
“UNCONSTITUTIONAL” LAWS: REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 71-154 (1998). 
 149 See, e.g., Bob Egelko, How Bush Sidesteps Intent of Congress, S.F. CHRON., 
May 7, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 7874400; Charlie Savage, Bush 
Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 
WLNR 7405669.  
 150 See AM. BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS 
AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE (2006).  The ABA Report itself has 
spawned much commentary.  See, e.g., Editorial, Read the Fine Print, N.Y. TIMES, July 
25, 2006, at A18, available at 2006 WLNR 12789590; Editorial, Review and Outlook: 
The ABA’s Agenda, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2006, at A10; Walter Dellinger, Op-Ed., A Slip 
of the Pen, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2006, at A17, available at 2006 WLNR 13174656.  
 151 The hearings were held before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on 
June 27, 2006.  Hearing on the Use of Presidential Signing Statements Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
hearing.cfm?id=1969.  The witness statements can be found at the Committee’s 
website.  Id.   
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obligation to enforce laws.152  If he deems a law 
unconstitutional, the Constitution provides for a veto and a 
corresponding mechanism for such veto to be overridden.153  By 
signing a bill into law but saying that some of that law will not 
be enforced, the President avoids the veto override process.154 
On the other side of the debate, there are those who 
argue that signing statements are generally legitimate.155  For 
example, one might argue that the President has an obligation 
to use his independent constitutional judgment when deciding 
to sign a bill into law because he too takes an oath to support 
and defend the Constitution.156  If he elects to sign a bill 
containing many provisions but believes that one portion of 
that bill is unconstitutional, he is performing a public service 
by making this position public.  Moreover, signing statements 
provide courts, other government entities, and the general 
public with information concerning the President’s overall 
views on the law he has signed.  In other words, signing 
statements, it may be argued, increase transparency in 
government. 
I do not take a position here concerning the merits of 
the various arguments in favor and against presidential 
signing statements.  The significant feature of the Bush signing 
statements in particular is that they do not add to 
transparency in government.  Rather, they are a further 
example of the administration’s secrecy.  Take for example the 
President’s signing statement in connection with the so-called 
“McCain Amendment” banning torture and degrading 
  
 152 For commentary critical of signing statements, see Phillip J. Cooper, 
George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of Presidential Signing 
Statements, 35 PRES. STUD. Q. 515, 516 (2005) [hereinafter Cooper, Edgar Allan Poe]; 
John W. Dean, The Problem with Presidential Signing Statements: Their Use and 
Misuse by the Bush Administration, FINDLAW, Jan. 13, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw. 
com/dean/20060113.html.  
 153 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 154 This strand of criticism has been enhanced because President Bush has 
vetoed only one bill.  See Off. of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Presidential 
Vetoes (1789 to Present), available at http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/ 
vetoes.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2006).  One needs to go back to the early days of the 
Republic to find a comparable record.  The last President who served as long as 
President Bush and vetoed fewer bills was James Monroe.  Id. 
 155 For commentary generally favorable to the use of signing statements, see 
Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive 
Power (U. Chi. Pub. Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 133, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=922400; Douglas W. Kmiec, It’s Not Just Alito’s Quandary: 
Reconciling Executive and Legislative Power, FINDLAW, Jan. 16, 2006, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/commentary/20060116_kmiec.html. 
 156 See U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 8.  
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treatment of prisoners held by the United States.157  The 
President signed the bill containing this amendment into law, 
but he simultaneously issued a statement that read in relevant 
part as follows: 
The executive branch shall construe [the amendment] in a manner 
consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to 
supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief 
and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial 
power, which will assist in achieving the shared objective of 
Congress and the President, evidenced in [the amendment], of 
protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks.158 
I confess to having no firm understanding of what is 
meant by this statement.  What exactly does the President 
mean when he directs the executive branch to construe the law 
“consistent with the limitations on the judicial power?”  What 
exactly is an interpretation of the law that is “consistent with 
the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the 
unitary executive branch?”  Far from increasing transparency 
in government, signing statements such as this one only serve 
to obscure the President’s position.159  Thus, even if those who 
argue in favor of their use are correct concerning the ability of 
signing statements to enhance transparency in government, 
the Bush administration’s use of that device has fallen woefully 
short of the mark.160  They tend to act more as a marquee 
  
 157 The McCain Amendment was included as Title X in Division A of the 
Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address 
Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, H.R. 2863, 109th Cong. 
(2006). 
 158 See President’s Statement on the Department of Defense, Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and the 
Pandemic Influenza Act, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005).   
 159 Indeed, to the extent such statements are capable of being understood, 
they appear to mean that the President will enforce the laws only to the extent he 
deems them constitutional in ways known only to him.  In this regard, one can also 
consider the content of the President’s signing statements as another example of 
Bushian unilateralism.  See supra Part III.A (discussing unilateralism).  
 160 Other commentators have similarly suggested that the Bush 
administration’s signing statements are unclear.  See, e.g., Cooper, Edgar Allan Poe, 
supra note 152, at 527 (“[o]ne of the problems [with the signing statements] is that the 
language in the statements has often been so broad that it is very difficult for anyone 
not trained in constitutional and administrative law to understand what is actually 
intended”); Article II and the Notice Question, http://www.orinkerr.com/page/4 (June 
27, 2006, 12:05 EST) (asking rhetorically “Does anyone actually know what [the 
McCain Amendment signing statement] means?” and noting that it seems to stand for 
the proposition that that the administration “won’t disclose precisely what” its views on 
executive power are); Posting of Laurence Tribe to Balkinization Blog, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com (Aug. 6, 2006, 20:00 EST) (noting that the content of 
President Bush’s signing statements are “much too protean to represent a useful 
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example of the first sub-attribute of the Bush administration’s 
unilateral use of power:  secrecy. 
2. Intolerance of Criticism and Questioning 
A second sub-attribute of the Bush administration’s 
unilateralism is intolerance to criticism and questioning.  This 
intolerance is widespread and takes many forms.  For example, 
it has recently come to light that student groups opposed to the 
war in Iraq as well as the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy 
have been subject to surveillance.161  In this same vein, several 
administration officials have suggested that criticism of 
President Bush on issues such as terrorism or the war in Iraq 
was unpatriotic.162  Indeed, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld has suggested that critics of the Bush administration 
are similar to political leaders who failed to confront Hitler in 
the 1930s.”163  But this general intolerance of criticism and 
questioning by the public at large may best be seen through the 
administration’s attitude towards the press.164  Not only has the 
administration been critical of the press in general, there have 
even been calls by those close to the administration to 
criminally prosecute members of the media who have disclosed 
  
organizing principle for assessing the undoubtedly dangerous and inflated views of 
unilateral presidential power that have characterized much of what the Bush 
administration has done”). 
 161 See Quick Takes: Shift Proposed for Upward Bound, Federal Inquiry at 
Yale, Rules on New Grant Programs, More Surveillance of Student Groups, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED, July 5, 2006, http://insidehighered.com/news/2006/07/05/qt (reporting on 
results of Freedom of Information Act requests indicating such surveillance at 
“universities nationwide”). 
 162 See, e.g., Charles Babington, Activists on Right, GOP Lawmakers Divided 
on Spying: Privacy Concerns, Terror Fight at Odds, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at A4 
(quoting Attorney General Gonzales as telling Congress that “[o]ur enemy is listening.  
And [he] cannot help but wonder if they aren’t . . . smiling at the prospect that we 
might now disclose even more, or perhaps even unilaterally disarm ourselves of a key 
tool in the war on terror”); Peter Baker, Bush Sharpens His Attack on Democrats, 
WASH. POST, June 29, 2006, at A10 (quoting President Bush as saying that critics of his 
Iraq policy were “waving the white flag of surrender”). 
 163 Donald Rumsfeld Speaks to American Legionnaires in Salt Lake City (CBS 
Evening News, Aug. 29, 2006) (reporting that Secretary Rumsfeld compared critics of 
the Bush administration “to those who tried to appease Hitler before World War II.”).  
 164 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 162 (discussing President Bush’s critical 
attitude towards the press in connection with the disclosure of certain intelligence 
programs); Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 4 (discussing the administration’s criticism 
of The New York Times for running a story concerning government monitoring of 
certain international financial transactions); Editorial, U.S. Rule of Law, MIAMI 
HERALD, June 15, 2006, at A22 (discussing exclusion of reporters from Guantanamo 
Bay Naval Station after three detainees committed suicide).   
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information concerning certain surveillance programs.165  
Taken together, such actions hamper the People’s ability to 
obtain information and play a meaningful role in the governing 
process.166 
However, the administration’s intolerance is not 
confined to the general public.  It also extends to other 
branches of the federal government.  For example, the 
administration was reluctant to share information with 
Congress about the “terrorist surveillance programs” even after 
those programs had been disclosed.167  As recently as July 2006, 
the Republican Chairperson of the House Intelligence 
Committee publicly complained that his committee had not 
been briefed concerning a certain still-secret surveillance 
program.168  Disclosure to the committee took place only after 
the Chairperson learned of the program from an informant.169 
And finally, one can find evidence of this resistance to 
questioning in the President’s signing statements discussed 
  
 165 For general criticism of the press, see supra note 164 and accompanying 
text.  For specific discussion of threats of criminal prosecution, see, for example, 
Howard Kurtz, Piling on the New York Times with a Scoop, WASH. POST, June 28, 
2006, at C1 (discussing comments from Republican members of Congress and 
conservative talk show hosts).  The controversy concerning the actions of the press in 
disclosing certain government programs also led to the preparation of a report by the 
Congressional Research Service on the issue.  See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, PROTECTION OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. RL33502 (2006) (on file with 
author), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL33502.pdf. 
 166 Both of the examples discussed in the text could as easily have been 
classified as evidence of the administration’s retributive streak, to which I turn in the 
next sub-part.  There is clearly overlap between these two sub-attributes of Bushian 
executive authority.  I elected to discuss these matters here because unlike pure 
retribution, these examples also illustrate a fundamental fear of opposition. 
 167 See, e.g., Charles Babington & Carol D. Leonning, Senate Rejects 
Wiretapping Probe, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2006, at A6 (discussing Bush administration 
efforts to “derail” investigations concerning warrantless wiretapping); Dan Eggen, 
Gonzales Defends Surveillance; Senators from Both Parties Challenge Attorney General 
on Program, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at A1 (noting that while testifying about the 
warrantless wiretapping program, Attorney General Gonzales “refus[ed] to answer 
dozens of questions”); Carl Hulse & Jim Rutenberg, Specter’s Uneasy Relationship with 
White House is Revealed in a Letter to Cheney, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2006, at A16 
(discussing White House efforts to keep Congress from investigating the participation 
of United States telephone companies in the NSA’s data-mining operations); Eric 
Lichtblau, Panel Rebuffed on Documents on U.S. Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at 
A1 (discussing the administration’s refusal to provide certain documents concerning 
the warrantless wiretapping program to Senate oversight committees); Eric Lichtblau, 
Gonzales Suggests Legal Basis for Domestic Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, 
at A23 (discussing comments by Republican House Judiciary Committee Chairperson 
that the administration was “stonewalling” congressional efforts to obtain information 
on warrantless wiretapping). 
 168 See supra note 146 (providing citations supporting this assertion).  
 169 Id.  
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above.170  Many of them concern objections even to providing 
information to Congress in connection with various programs.171 
The intolerance to criticism and questioning extends 
into the executive branch itself.  For example, when the 
administration was considering the use of certain interrogation 
techniques, a senior Department of Defense lawyer expressed 
concern.172  Evidently such frank criticism, even behind closed 
doors, was not appreciated, because the final version of the 
report was issued without circulating it to in-house lawyers 
such as the person who complained.173  He “learned that a final 
version had been issued only after the Abu Ghraib [Iraqi 
prison] scandal broke.”174  In a similar incident, it appears that 
President Bush effectively ended an internal investigation by 
the Office of Professional Responsibility in the Department of 
Justice into the role played by department lawyers in certain 
NSA surveillance programs when he refused to give security 
clearances to the investigators.175 
Such a unilateral, secretive, and overly sensitive Article 
II Executive imperils two of the foundational principles.  First, 
by limiting access to information by other political centers of 
  
 170 See supra Part III.B. 
 171 See, e.g., President’s Statement on Signing the USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 425 (Mar. 
9, 2006) (“The executive branch shall construe the provisions of [the Act] that call for 
furnishing information to entities outside the executive branch . . . in a manner 
consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to supervise the unitary 
executive branch and to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair 
foreign relations, national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the 
performance of the Executive’s constitutional duties.”); President’s Statement on 
Signing the Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, 
the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, 41 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1800, 1800-01 (Nov. 30, 2005) (“The executive branch shall 
construe provisions of the [Act] that purport to mandate or regulate submission of 
information to the Congress, other entities outside the executive branch, or the public, 
in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to withhold 
information that could impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative 
processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s constitutional 
duties.”); President’s Statement on Signing the Animal Disease Risk Assessment, 
Prevention, and Control Act of 2001, 1 PUB. PAPERS 575, 575 (May 24, 2001) (“Section 3 
of the bill requires the Secretary of Agriculture to submit to certain committees and 
subcommittees of the Congress a preliminary report concerning [certain matters].  
Section 3 will be interpreted in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority 
of the President to recommend to the consideration of the Congress such measures as 
the President shall judge necessary and expedient.”). 
 172 See Tim Golden, Senior Lawyer at Pentagon Broke Ranks on Detainees, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at  A8.   
 173 Id. 
 174 Id.  
 175 See Dan Eggen, Bush Thwarted Probe into NSA Wiretapping, WASH. POST, 
July 19, 2006, at A4. 
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authority, this aspect of Bush unilateralism impinges on the 
ability of other political actors to provide a meaningful check on 
the Executive.  How can Congress provide oversight when it is 
denied information, sometimes even about the existence of a 
program?176  Similarly, the People are hampered in their ability 
to participate in the process because, in its fear of criticism, the 
administration restricts access to the information necessary for 
such meaningful participation.  Thus, when confronting the 
broad-based assertions of power currently at play, a court 
should consider this sub-attribute in addition to the more 
obvious issues concerning unilateralism or secrecy. 
3. Retribution 
Finally, the Bush administration’s conception of 
executive authority contains important retributive elements.  
Those who disagree with its positions—whether inside the 
government or out—are subject to punishment in various 
forms.  The danger of this retributive streak is that it will 
reduce the willingness of the general public and/or of other 
political centers of authority to play a meaningful role in the 
constitutional system.  A few examples are sufficient to 
illustrate this sub-attribute of Bushian executive authority. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of retribution is the 
saga surrounding Ambassador Joseph Wilson and his wife 
Valerie Plame.  As is commonly known now, in his January 
2003, State of the Union address, President Bush referred to a 
purported attempt by al Qaeda to purchase uranium from 
Niger.177  Eventually doubt was cast on this assertion in sources 
including an op-ed piece by former Ambassador Wilson.178  The 
Bush administration was not happy about Wilson’s public 
comments and, it appears by all accounts, took steps at the 
  
 176 Similarly, how can the internal operations of the various components of the 
executive branch provide a meaningful internal check on abuse when information is 
restricted and questioning is discouraged?  This point is important because several 
scholars have recently suggested that an important check on unilateral or excessive 
presidential power can be found within Article II’s various structures.  See, e.g., Neal 
Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316-18 (2006) [hereinafter Katyal, 
Separation of Powers]; Pillard, supra note 147, at 1297. 
 177 See Bush Engulfed in CIA Leak Claims, CNN.COM, Sept. 30, 2003, 
http://cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/09/29/wilson.cia.intl/index.html [hereinafter Bush 
Engulfed] (describing background of what was to become the saga concerning the 
disclosure of Plame’s identity).  
 178 See Joseph C. Wilson, IV, What I Didn’t Find in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 
2003, § 4, at 9. 
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highest levels to punish him.179  Those efforts allegedly included 
outing Ambassador Wilson’s wife, an agent for the CIA.180  The 
truth of what happened concerning Ms. Plame is by no means 
clear and unfortunately may never be known.  What is not in 
doubt, however, is that the administration was intent on 
discrediting a critic. 
This same retributive tendency can be seen in various 
actions taken with respect to internal executive branch 
employees who acted in ways at odds with the administration’s 
views.  For example, an employee of a CIA contractor claimed 
she was fired over a comment made on a blog that 
waterboarding, a type of interrogation technique, was 
torture.181  Similarly, Newsweek magazine has reported that 
lawyers in the administration who questioned unilateral 
executive actions “did so at their peril” because they were 
“ostracized” and “some were denied promotions.”182 
Finally, the press is also included in the retributive 
efforts of the Bush administration.  When faced with leaks of 
classified information, the Bush administration threatened to 
prosecute journalists for espionage.183  In addition, there have 
been several attempts to obtain reporters’ phone records in 
investigations concerning leaks about secret government 
operations.184  The end result of these efforts is that fear of 
retribution is likely to reduce participation in the political 
  
 179 See, e.g., Bush Engulfed, supra note 177; CIA Leak Probe Looks at Cheney 
Writings, CNN.COM, May 13, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/05/13/cia.leak/ 
index.html.  See also Complaint at paras. 18-23, 33-34, Wilson v. Libby, No. 06-CV-
01258 (D.D.C. filed July 13, 2006), available at http://www.expose-the-war-profiteers. 
org/archive/legal/2006/20060713.pdf [hereinafter Wilson Complaint].   
 180 See generally Wilson Complaint, supra note 179, at paras. 34-38. 
 181 Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Worker Says Message on Torture Got Her Fired, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 2006, at A11.  
 182 Daniel Klaidman, Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Palace Revolt, 
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 2006, at 34.  
 183 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justice Dept. is Criticized by Ex-Official on 
Subpoenas, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2006, at A16 (noting that Attorney General Gonzales 
“hinted” that the government might decide to prosecute journalists for “publishing 
classified information”); Walter Pincus, Senator May Seek Tougher Law on Leaks, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2006, at A4 (discussing attempts to amend federal law to make it 
easier to prosecute journalists for publishing classified information); Walter Pincus, 
Silence Angers Judiciary Panel, WASH. POST, June 7, 2006, at A5 (discussing testimony 
of Department of Justice official refusing to rule out prosecution of journalists for 
publishing classified information). 
 184 See, e.g., Drew, supra note 8 (describing investigative efforts focused on 
journalists, including attempts to obtain and review the papers of deceased 
investigative reporter Jack Anderson). 
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process that might otherwise act as a counterbalance to an 
increase in federal executive authority. 
This Part has described and illustrated the significant 
attributes of the Bushian vision of executive power under the 
Constitution. That vision has at its core a strong commitment 
to unilateralism.  It envisions a president who may act largely 
on his or her own authority along a broad spectrum of topics.  
However, the Bushian vision also has three distinct sub-
attributes, each of which was described in detail: a 
commitment to secrecy; intolerance to questioning or criticism; 
and a tendency to punish those who do engage in questioning 
or criticism.  Part IV applies the structural equilibrium theory 
set out in Part II to the October 2005 Term of the United States 
Supreme Court.   
IV. AN APPLICATION OF THEORY:  THE OCTOBER 2005 TERM 
Part II argued that courts should act as agents of 
structural equilibrium when faced with broad constitutionally 
envelope-pushing extra-constitutional change.  Part III 
described the particular attributes of the Bush administration’s 
envelope-pushing view of the scope of executive authority 
under Article II.  The core principle of that view is executive 
unilateralism, with sub-themes of a lack of transparency in the 
exercise of power, intolerance to criticism and questioning, and 
retribution against internal and external critics. The courts’ 
challenge when responding to this particular extra-
constitutional change is to ensure that the actions of another 
center of political authority—here the federal executive—do not 
undermine the constitutional foundational principles:  
(1) maintenance of effective centers of political authority both 
vertically and horizontally; (2) preservation of a meaningful 
role for the People in the political process; and (3) ensuring 
that the resulting constitutional structure of government is 
capable of functioning.185 
The key to the successful implementation of the 
structural equilibrium approach is for the judiciary to take a 
broad-spectrum approach when confronted with a wide-ranging 
position of another center of political authority.  It does not do 
for the courts to respond piecemeal to a wide-ranging approach 
of another constitutional actor because the foundational 
  
 185 These three foundational principles are discussed in depth above.  See 
supra Part II.B. 
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principles may be imperiled even if each individual envelope-
pushing action is constitutionally appropriate.  In other words, 
the sum of the constitutional change may be greater than its 
individual elements.  Yet, at the same time the courts must be 
constantly vigilant that they do not use the power of judicial 
review in such a way that the foundational principles are 
undermined as a result; the cure should not be worse than the 
disease. 
In this Part, I apply the structural equilibrium approach 
by evaluating matters the Supreme Court considered during its 
October 2005 Term.  I do not suggest that the Court actually 
used the approach; in other words, I am not making a 
descriptive claim.  Rather, I use the Term normatively to 
suggest how the Court should have approached various matters 
under the structural equilibrium approach given the Bush 
administration’s particular view of Article II authority.  In 
some cases, the actual results the Court reached remain the 
same, while in others I suggest the results should be different 
in important respects. 
The balance of this Part is divided into three sections.  
First, I consider cases that directly implicate the first 
foundational principle dealing with the horizontal and vertical 
centers of political authority.  In this area, the one most 
obviously implicated in the Bush administration’s assertions of 
executive authority, I suggest that the Court’s actual decisions 
accord well with the structural equilibrium approach.186  
Second, I consider cases that less obviously deal with the Bush 
administration’s particular executive power push.  This group 
of cases, instead, deals with matters that are critical to 
maintaining a meaningful role for the other power centers as 
well as the People.  In this area, some of the Court’s results 
accord with the structural equilibrium theory, while others do 
not.187  Finally, I address a series of cases that more directly 
focus on the Bushian attributes of intolerance and retribution.  
In this area, I conclude that the Court’s decisions were failures 
under the structural equilibrium theory.188  And as to each of 
these matters, it is important to ensure that the third 
foundational principle is maintained.  That is, courts must 
  
 186 See infra Part IV.A. 
 187 See infra Part IV.B. 
 188 See infra Part IV.C. 
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always be cognizant of the need to maintain a functioning 
system of constitutional government. 
A. Maintaining Horizontal and Vertical Centers of Political 
Authority 
The defining foundational principle is the existence and 
maintenance of independent centers of political authority at 
the state and federal levels.  These vertical and horizontal 
centers must be meaningfully capable of serving their function 
of checking the accretion of power in any single center.  A court 
faced with a broad-based attempt by any given center should 
ensure that this foundational principle is protected.   
There are many ways in which the judiciary can fulfill 
this mission.  At times it may be called upon to exercise the 
strong version of Marbury v. Madison in which the power to 
say “what the law is” is exercised to its fullest.189  Of course, the 
danger attendant to this approach is the risk that a court may 
undermine the foundational principle it seeks to protect by 
empowering the judicial branch with too much authority.  
Thus, courts will at times need to use more subtle forms of 
judicial review to protect the foundational principles most 
effectively.  Two illustrations of such subtle review are 
channeling and signaling. 
When a court uses a channeling form of judicial review 
it re-directs the matter in question to other centers of political 
authority.  Thus, if Center A takes certain actions that 
undercut the ability of Center B to participate in constitutional 
governance, the courts may rule in a manner that channels the 
dispute back into the constitutional process, so that the other 
centers of authority have a meaningful opportunity to act.  The 
end result may not be altered, because the originally excluded 
centers of authority might reach the same conclusion as did the 
unilaterally operating center.  However, that fact should not 
obscure the importance of the channeling function.190  It 
ensures that the first foundational principle is maintained.191  
  
 189 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  I also 
discussed Marbury earlier.  See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 190 As some of the examples that follow demonstrate, channeling may also 
serve to support the other foundational principles.  For example, an issue may be 
channeled to a political center of authority in such a way that the People’s role in the 
governing process is protected or enhanced.  Moreover, the channeling may be 
structured in order to maintain the ultimate functioning of the government.  To the 
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Signaling operates in a different way.  Here, a court 
resolves a given case without reaching a controversial issue.192  
However, along the way the court provides clues of a sort to the 
other centers of authority about the issue that was avoided.  In 
this way, the court avoids engaging in the strong version of 
judicial review but indicates to the other power centers that 
there could be issues on the horizon if certain conditions arise.  
Merely by acting in this way, the judiciary may be able to best 
preserve the foundational principles. 
One can see in the October 2005 Term examples of both 
channeling and signaling in response to the Bush 
administration’s broad assertions of unilateral executive power.  
I discuss three examples below. 
  
extent that a channeling decision would make the government non-functional, the 
court should not engage in such a process. 
 191 As I have explained, my effort in this Article is not descriptive even as to 
the October 2005 Term and I certainly do not purport to prove that the Court has 
followed a structural equilibrium approach in other historical eras.  However, some 
recent scholarship has suggested that in times of crisis the Supreme Court has 
employed an institutional, process-based approach in which it channels decisions 
concerning the balance between liberty and security into the political process.  See, e.g., 
Lee Epstein, Daniel E. Ho, Gary King & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Supreme Court During 
Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 74-77 (2005); 
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive 
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 1, 1-2 (2004), available at http://www.bepress.com/til/ 
default/vol5/iss1/art1; Kinkopf, supra note 45, at 1181-94; Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi’s 
Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization?, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 411-16 (2006).  
Such actions would be consistent with the structural equilibrium model to the extent 
they were taken during a time of actual or potential extra-constitutional change.   
 192 For example, a court might interpret a statute to avoid a constitutional 
question or the court might dismiss a case for lack of standing.  This type of approach 
to judging in which courts employ various elements of the avoidance cannon is 
controversial and has sparked much debate.  See generally LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, 
PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW (2001); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 
85 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance 
Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000).  The 
debate over constitutional avoidance principles has also recently expanded to include 
whether the doctrine has any legitimate application to executive and legislative action.  
See generally William K. Kelly, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch 
Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831 (2001); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional 
Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006).  My support of a 
signaling function as discussed in the text suggests that the judicial use of the 
avoidance cannon when combined with signals to other centers of political authority is 
the best way for courts to proceed at times.  I discuss one such example in this sub-part.  
See infra Part IV.A.3.  At other times, however, maintenance of the foundational 
principles suggests that the courts not employ the avoidance cannon.  See infra Parts 
IV.B and IV.C (discussing examples that fall into this category).  This area reflects, 
then, the context-specific nature of the structural equilibrium approach I advocate.  
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1. Horizontal Channeling:  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
On the last day on which decisions were announced for 
the October 2005 Term, the Supreme Court issued its opinion 
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.193  The lasting import of that decision 
will probably not be known for some time.  In this sub-part, I 
explore the decision not to situate it in constitutional doctrine.  
Instead, I use the decision as an example of how channeling 
may be employed as part of the structural equilibrium 
approach.  This discussion may have broader implications, 
however, because it suggests that Hamdan is a more judicially 
modest decision than many observers believe. 
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a citizen of Yemen, was 
captured by local militia forces in Afghanistan and, in June 
2002, turned over to the United States.194  He was transported 
to the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
and eventually designated as eligible for trial before a military 
commission.195  Thereafter, Hamdan sought a writ of habeas 
corpus from a federal court arguing that the military 
commissions as constituted lacked the authority to try him.196  
As described above, the military commissions were almost 
exclusively of the Bush administration’s creation.197 
Eventually the case reached the Supreme Court.  The 
Court ruled in favor of Hamdan, holding that the military 
commissions under which he was to be tried were unlawful.198  
  
 193 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 194 Id. at 2759. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the Bush administration’s various 
unilateral actions concerning enemy combatants).  
 198 Hamdan is a complex decision with multiple holdings.  Indeed, six of the 
eight participating justices wrote opinions.  See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2758 (listing 
Justices writing opinions).  I have in no way sought to discuss these opinions in the 
depth they deserve.  As I explain in the text, I use the decision as an illustration of the 
structural equilibrium approach.  Nevertheless, it is possible to provide the following 
high-level summary.  Five members of the Court (Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer) agreed that: (1) the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (“DTA”), 
Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, did not strip the Court of appellate jurisdiction to 
consider Hamdan’s appeal, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762-69; (2) the federal courts 
should not abstain from considering Hamdan’s case, id. at 2769-72; (3) neither the DTA 
nor the AUMF expressly authorized the military commission at issue, id. at 2772-75; 
and (4) the military commission at issue was unlawful because its structure and 
procedures violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions.  Id. at 2786-98.  Four Justices would have held that the 
conspiracy charge leveled against Hamdan was not an offense triable by a military 
commission.  Id. at 2775-86.  Justice Kennedy did not find it necessary to reach this 
issue.  Id. at 2808-09. 
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What is critical for purposes of this Article is the way in which 
the Court reached its fundamental conclusion concerning 
illegality.   
When confronted with the serious questions in Hamdan 
going to the very heart of the American constitutional order, 
the Court could have elected to exercise the strong form of 
Marbury’s judicial review.  Thus, the Court could have squarely 
held that the Constitution did not allow the Executive to 
unilaterally convene military commissions.  Such a ruling 
would have locked in an interpretation of the Constitution that 
was highly controversial, with the effect that the matter was 
removed from political debate.199  This form of decision would, 
then, have greatly enhanced the power of the judicial branch at 
the expense of the Article II Executive. 
Instead, the Court took a more measured approach that 
is entirely consistent with the structural equilibrium theory.  It 
channeled debate over the structure of the military 
commissions into the political process.  For example, the Court 
concluded that Congress had already established the form and 
fundamental procedures of the type of military commission at 
issue.200  Congress could elect to change those procedures if 
convinced by the President that such a change was necessary.201  
  
 199 Academic commentators have vigorously debated the President’s unilateral 
authority to constitute military commissions.  Some scholars strongly contend that the 
President lacks such authority.  See generally Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, 
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1260 
(2002) (“The Constitution requires as well that, absent circumstances so exigent as 
demonstrably to rule out resort to Congress, that lawmaking body and not the 
Commander in Chief be the authorizing agent and the architect of the tribunals 
themselves.”).  Others equally vigorously argue that the President’s orders concerning 
military commissions were constitutional.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249, 
252-54 (2002).  Two Members of the Court have also strongly intimated that the 
President has the unilateral constitutional authority to constitute the military 
commissions at issue in Hamdan.  See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2826 n.2 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.) (“Although the President very well may have inherent 
authority to try unlawful combatants for violations of the law of war before military 
commissions, we need not decide that question because Congress has authorized the 
President to do so.” (citations omitted)).  Justice Alito, the other Hamdan dissenter, 
declined to join the portion of Justice Thomas’s dissent in which he suggested some 
support for inherent presidential authority because Justice Alito found it “unnecessary 
to reach” the issue.  Id. at 2849-50 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 200 See, e.g., Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2787-93.  As Justice Stevens put it early in 
his majority opinion, the authority to constitute military commissions to try offences 
“can derive only from the powers granted jointly to the President and Congress in time 
of war.”  Id. at 2773 (citations omitted). 
 201 The same can be said with respect to the Court’s conclusion that the 
President’s unilaterally constituted military commissions violated the Geneva 
Conventions.  See id. at 2793-98.  Congress could alter that holding by legislation 
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This channeling of debate into the political process that the 
unilateral executive action had avoided was made more explicit 
in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion.  He wrote:   
The Court’s conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground:  
Congress has not issued the Executive a “blank check.”  Indeed, 
Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to create 
military commissions of the kind at issue here.  Nothing prevents 
the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he 
believes necessary.202 
One can also see at work in Hamdan a concern for 
another foundational principle, namely that the constitutional 
structure must be capable of effectively carrying out the 
responsibilities of government.  The Court made clear that its 
decision was based on the absence of a practical need;203 in 
other words, the emergency of September 11th or the 
exigencies of a battlefield were too far removed from the 
situation in which the President unilaterally elected to 
constitute the military commissions at issue.  Justice Kennedy 
spent a good portion of his concurrence making the point that 
there was no apparent necessity for taking this particular 
unilateral executive action.204  The implication, of course, is that 
in the event of an emergency or in connection with battlefield 
captures, the President’s powers would likely be more 
expansive.  It is true that it was the Court that made this 
determination concerning non-emergency conditions.  However, 
as discussed in this sub-part, it did so in a modest manner and 
with due regard for the functionality of government.205 
  
under the “later-in-time” rule giving later enacted statutes precedence over treaties as 
the law of the land.  See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2689 (2006). 
 202 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  
Justice Kennedy made a similar point in his concurring opinion.  See id. at 2799-800 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 203 See, e.g., id. at 2797-98. 
 204 See id. at 2804-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 205 Of course, exactly how modest the Court was in Hamdan is a matter open 
to debate.  For example, Professor Cass Sunstein has recently written that in Hamdan, 
the Court “went well beyond anything [it] has done in the past.”  Cass R. Sunstein, 
Clear Statement Principles and National Security: Hamdan and Beyond 4 (U. Chi. Pub. 
Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 134, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=922406.  Nevertheless, Professor Sunstein also identifies as 
Hamdan’s central theme a concept entirely consistent with my analysis.  He notes that 
Hamdan’s core holding “can be captured in a single idea: If the President seeks to 
depart from standard adjudicative forms through the use of military tribunals, the 
departure must be authorized by an explicit and focused decision from the national 
legislature.”  Id.  (italics removed).  
2007] EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 921 
 
The end result is that the Court’s decision in Hamdan is 
a near-perfect example of the use of the structural equilibrium 
principle to preserve foundational principles.206  The Court 
channeled debate into the constitutionally established political 
process, avoided aggrandizement of the judicial branch, and 
respected the need for effective government.207  Post-Hamdan 
experience suggests that the Court was successful in its efforts.  
In late 2006, Congress passed and the President signed into 
law the Military Commissions Act of 2006.208  This Act cures the 
separation of powers issues vetted in Hamdan through explicit 
legislative action in place of unilateral executive fiat.209  
Whether or not the commissions authorized in this statute run 
afoul of other constitutional provisions is a question beyond the 
scope of this Article.  What is certain, however, is that the 
democracy-deficit infecting the President’s unilateral attempt 
to establish military commissions has been cured.210 
  
 206 One could also include as horizontal channeling the Court’s holding 
concerning the jurisdiction stripping effect of certain provisions of the DTA.  The Court 
did not address whether such stripping of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction would 
offend the Constitution.  Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2764.  Instead, it held, using certain 
principles of statutory construction, that the DTA did not in fact strip the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.  Id. at 2764-69.  Thus, the Court channeled the issue into the 
political process in which Congress and the President could enact another provision 
that clearly indicated an intention to strip the Court of jurisdiction in a later case.  In 
this way the Court preserved the foundational principle concerning separation of 
powers without making a constitutional ruling that could have led to an unwarranted 
increase in its own authority at the expense of another horizontal power center. 
 207 The channeling aspect of Hamdan was recognized in media coverage of the 
decision.  See, e.g., Editorial, A Victory for Law, WASH. POST, June 30, 2006, at A26; 
David S. Broder, The Court Hands Congress an Opportunity, WASH. POST, July 6, 2006, 
at A21; Bravin, supra note 98.  Of course, there was also disagreement with the 
assessment that the Court’s decision was modest from a separation of powers 
perspective.  See, e.g., Editorial, After Hamdan, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2006, at A10 (“The 
Court’s opinion masks its own power grab by asserting that the executive must defer 
more to Congress in designing military commissions.”); Adam Liptak, The Court Enters 
the War, Loudly, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, § 4, at 1 (quoting law Professor John Yoo as 
reading Hamdan as an illustration of the Court “attempting to suppress creative 
thinking[,]” and as the Court’s “declar[ation] that it’s going to be very intrusive in the 
war on terror”). 
 208 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(2006). 
 209 See, e.g., id. § 3 (explicitly authorizing military commissions); id. § 4 
(describing military commission authorized under the act including who would be 
eligible for trial before the commissions as well as the offenses triable). 
 210 As of this writing, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 has also had a 
direct impact on Mr. Hamdan, whose case was the catalyst for congressional action.  In 
December of 2006, United States District Court Judge John Robertson dismissed Mr. 
Hamdan’s petition for habeas corpus based on a provision in the Act that stripped 
courts of jurisdiction to consider such petitions.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 04-1519, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89933, at *31 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2006).  It seems almost certain 
that this litigation will continue as the constitutionality of the jurisdiction-stripping 
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Of course, in the long run the success of such channeling 
efforts at preserving constitutional decision making processes 
ultimately depends on the ability and willingness of Congress 
to live up to its constitutional role.  It is by no means clear that 
Congress will do so across the board,211 but that is a discussion 
for another day.  
2. Horizontal and Vertical Channeling:  Gonzales v. 
Oregon 
The October 2005 Term also provides an example of 
vertical channeling.  As discussed above, in November 2001, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft issued the Ashcroft Directive, 
making it unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act for 
doctors to prescribe drugs that could lawfully be prescribed 
under Oregon law to assist in an ill patient’s suicide.212   
Oregon and several affected individuals sued, claiming 
that the Ashcroft Directive exceeded the Attorney General’s 
authority.  That case eventually reached the Supreme Court, 
which ruled in favor of Oregon.213  The Court’s opinion is 
heavily focused on familiar administrative law concepts, such 
as the deference owed to administrative agency interpretations 
of statutes.214  It is certainly important for that reason, as well 
as for the quite practical impact the decision had on the 
citizens of Oregon.  However, it is also an example of the 
Court’s use of channeling a unilateral executive action back 
into the political process. 
First, the decision is another example of horizontal 
channeling.  The Court’s opinion is based on its interpretation 
of the Controlled Substances Act.215  Thus, as with much of 
  
portion of the Act is considered by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit and, perhaps, even by the United States Supreme Court. 
 211 Academic commentators have criticized Congress for being too complacent 
in asserting itself as a political institution capable of checking the executive branch.  
See, e.g., Katyal, Separation of Powers, supra note 176, at 2319-22; Levinson & Pildes, 
supra note 61, at 2351-56.   
 212 See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the Ashcroft Directive as an example of 
Bush administration unilateralism).  
 213 Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 925-26 (2006). 
 214 Id. at 916-22 (discussing whether deference to the Attorney General’s 
interpretive rule was appropriate under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Counsel, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) or United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)).  
 215 See id. at 925 (summarizing the Court’s holding by noting that “[t]he text 
and structure of the [Controlled Substances Act] show that Congress did not have this 
far-reaching intent to alter the federal-state balance and the congressional role in 
maintaining it”). 
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what was discussed concerning Hamdan, Congress could 
change the result in Gonzales v. Oregon if it elected to do so. 
The decision also reflects a form of channeling to the 
vertical power centers the states occupy.  The Court reinforced 
the abilities of states to act not just as laboratories—to 
paraphrase Justice Brandeis216—but also as meaningful 
counterbalances to unilateral action by the federal government 
or any individual branch.  Moreover, the decision supports the 
foundational principle concerning the People’s power to 
participate in government.  After all, the impetus for the 
Oregon Death with Dignity Act was a popular referendum.217  
As such, the rejection of unilateral federal executive action not 
only empowered Oregon the state, it also empowered Oregon’s 
citizens.  In short, Gonzales v. Oregon is a decision that fits 
comfortably within the structural equilibrium approach on a 
number of levels. 
3. Horizontal Signaling:  Padilla v. Rumsfeld 
The Supreme Court also utilized signaling during the 
October 2005 Term in a manner consistent with the structural 
equilibrium approach.  This tactic is apparent in the Court’s 
action concerning Jose Padilla.  Mr. Padilla is a United States 
citizen who was detained on May 8, 2002, by civilian law 
enforcement personnel after he deplaned at Chicago’s O’Hare 
Airport.218  Padilla was then transported to New York City, 
where he was held in a law enforcement detention facility and 
appointed counsel.219  On June 9, 2002, President Bush 
designated Mr. Padilla as an enemy combatant and ordered 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to take him into military 
custody.220  The Secretary complied and transferred Mr. Padilla 
from New York City to a military facility in South Carolina.221 
  
 216 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 217 Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 911. 
 218 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426, 456 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
Padilla’s detention was pursuant to a material witness warrant.  Id.  In other words, he 
was originally taken into custody because the government had established to a judge’s 
satisfaction that Padilla’s “testimony . . . [was] material in a criminal proceeding, 
and . . . that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by 
subpoena . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000). 
 219 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 456 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. at 456-57. 
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There was much litigation concerning Mr. Padilla’s 
detention.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit ruled in 2003 that Mr. Padilla’s petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus should be granted.222  The Supreme Court 
reversed that determination in a 5-4 decision, ultimately 
concluding that the Southern District of New York was not the 
proper forum to consider Padilla’s petition.223 
Padilla began his habeas corpus litigation again in the 
District of South Carolina.  That court granted Padilla’s 
petition.224  The government appealed and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s granting of the petition.225  In a strongly pro-executive 
power decision, the court held that the AUMF authorized the 
President to detain and hold as an enemy combatant an 
American citizen captured on American soil.226  Mr. Padilla 
sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.227 
At this point, things took a rather remarkable turn.  
While the Supreme Court was considering Padilla’s request to 
hear his appeal, the government filed a motion with the Fourth 
Circuit to vacate the court’s pro-government opinion and to 
allow it to transfer Mr. Padilla to civilian law enforcement 
officials in the Southern District of Florida.228  On the same day 
that the government made these requests, an indictment of 
Padilla in the Southern District of Florida was unsealed.229  
That indictment made no mention of the various terrorism-
related allegations that purportedly formed the basis of the 
President’s decision to designate Padilla as an enemy 
combatant in the first place.230 
In a strongly worded opinion, the Fourth Circuit denied 
the government’s request to transfer Padilla and withdraw the 
opinion.231  At the core of the court’s concern was the 
  
 222 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426 
(2004). 
 223 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 451. 
 224 Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. 2005). 
 225 Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 226 Id. at 389. 
 227 See Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006).  
 228 Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 2005).  
 229 Id.  
 230 Id. 
 231 The following is an example of the court’s forceful opinion: 
[T]he government’s actions since this court’s decision issued on September 9, 
culminating in and including its urging that our opinion be withdrawn, 
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appearance that the government was seeking to avoid Supreme 
Court review of the Fourth Circuit’s decision.232  The court at 
least implicitly recognized the government’s action as a species 
of unilateralism. 
The Supreme Court once again faced a decision as to 
how to respond to an action by the executive branch that 
threatened the foundational principles.  The Fourth Circuit 
decision denying Padilla’s petition was favorable to unilateral 
executive action, yet its decision concerning the government’s 
motion to transfer Padilla was confrontational.  The Supreme 
Court’s ultimate resolution of the Padilla quagmire is an 
excellent example of protecting foundational principles through 
the modest use of judicial power. 
First, the Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s refusal to 
transfer Padilla to civilian custody.233  In this way, the Court 
avoided a needless confrontation with the executive as well as 
any possibility of aggrandizing the judicial branch.  Yet, the 
Court still needed to address Padilla’s pending request that it 
review the Fourth Circuit’s original decision denying his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  The Court denied the 
writ.234   
Significantly, however, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Stevens, issued a rare opinion 
concurring in the denial of certiorari.235  This opinion is a classic 
signaling device.  In it, three Justices from across the Court’s 
perceived political spectrum indicated to the executive branch 
that the judiciary will be monitoring the actions of the 
  
together with the timing of these actions in relation both to the period for 
which Padilla has already been held and to the government’s scheduled 
response to Padilla’s certiorari petition in the Supreme Court, have given rise 
to at least an appearance that the purpose of these actions may be to avoid 
consideration of our decision by the Supreme Court. 
Id. at 585.  
 232 Id. 
 233 Hanft v. Padilla, 126 S. Ct. 978 (2006).  As of the writing of this Article, it 
is unclear how Mr. Padilla’s case will ultimately be resolved.  At an early hearing in 
the case, United States District Judge Marcia Cooke expressed some initial skepticism 
about the government’s case, calling it “light on facts.”  See Vanessa Blum, Judge 
Orders Details on Padilla, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 21, 2006, available at 2006 
WLNR 10684779.  Thereafter, Judge Cooke dismissed several of the counts on which 
Mr. Padilla was indicted.  See Omnibus Order at 1, United States v. Padilla, No. 04-
CR-60001 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2006). 
 234 Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006). 
 235 Id. at 1649-50. 
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executive in the future.236  Thus, the Court was able to avoid 
making a strong Marbury judicial review decision on a 
fundamental constitutional question while at the same time 
taking a modest action designed to preserve a foundational 
principle.  Such signaling is even more effective when combined 
with the channeling actions I have also discussed. 
In sum, the October 2005 Term provides excellent 
examples of how courts could apply the structural equilibrium 
approach in the context of the first foundational principle.  
These examples also demonstrate the ways in which it is 
possible for a court to preserve foundational principles without 
undermining the equally important need to maintain a 
functioning government.  But the examples discussed in this 
sub-part all raised the separation of powers concern explicitly.  
In order to carry out the role of agents of structural 
equilibrium, courts must look more broadly than the specific 
issues presented in individual cases.  Again using examples 
from the October 2005 Term, the following two sub-parts 
illustrate how this aspect of the approach I advocate would 
work. 
B. Strengthening the Political Process 
As described above, the Court’s October 2005 Term was 
illustrative of the successful implementation of the structural 
equilibrium approach with respect to the maintenance of 
horizontal and vertical centers of political authority.  By and 
large, the situations in which the Court acted consistently with 
this principle were obvious in their threat to the constitutional 
value at stake.  In other words, each situation starkly 
presented a move by the federal executive authority to increase 
its power.  To succeed as an agent of structural equilibrium, 
  
 236 See id. at 1650 (“Were the Government to seek to change the status or 
conditions of Padilla’s custody, [the district] court would be in a position to rule quickly 
on any [motion Padilla filed].  In such an event, the District Court, as well as other 
courts of competent jurisdiction, should act promptly to ensure that the office and 
purposes of the writ of habeas corpus are not compromised.  Padilla, moreover, retains 
the option of seeking a writ of habeas corpus in this Court.”).  In a Findlaw column 
shortly after the Supreme Court denied review in Padilla’s case, Professor Dorf also 
noted the significance of Justice Kennedy’s opinion.  See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme 
Court Denies Review in the Case of “Dirty Bomber” Jose Padilla, but an Unusual Troika 
of Justices, Including the Chief, Issues a Warning to the Government, FINDLAW, April 
12, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20060412.html.  Of course, not all observers 
agree that the Court was correct in rejecting Padilla’s writ of certiorari.  See, e.g., Bruce 
Ackerman, The Perils of Judicial Restraint, SLATE, Apr. 5, 2006, http://www.slate.com/ 
id/2139371 (criticizing the Court’s refusal to take the case).  
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however, a court must be aware of more than the obvious 
threats to the foundational principles.  The October 2005 Term 
is less illustrative of this aspect of the structural equilibrium 
approach.  The balance of this part considers the Court’s mixed 
record in the Term concerning preservation of the integrity of 
the political process.  The following sub-part turns to the 
Court’s complete failure to respond to the Bush 
Administration’s particular penchant for secrecy, intolerance of 
questioning, and retribution.  
The Court’s efforts to channel disputes into the political 
branches of government are only a part of what should be done 
to protect the foundational principles.  Unless the Court also 
protects the process by which those democratic branches are 
constituted, the channeling will have little practical effect.  In 
other words, the courts also need to preserve the second 
foundational principle concerning the role of the People in the 
American constitutional order.  Considered on these terms, the 
October 2005 Term was decidedly mixed.  I consider below one 
decision that is consistent with the structural equilibrium 
approach and then turn to one that is not. 
1. Money and Politics: Randall v. Sorrell 
While we may bemoan the relationship between money 
and politics, it is quite clear that in today’s political system one 
must raise significant funds to mount a competitive race for 
most offices of any significance.237  But with fundraising comes 
a fear that candidates may be bought by the highest bidder.  
Thus, there is a tension between the reality that money and 
politics go together and the public policy-based fear of 
corruption in the electoral system.  One way in which this 
tension has been made manifest is the enactment of campaign 
finance laws seeking to limit the impact of money in the 
process, and the Supreme Court’s consequent evaluation of 
those laws under the First Amendment.238 
  
 237 See generally Mark C. Alexander, Let Them Do Their Jobs: The Compelling 
Government Interest in Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected Officials, 37 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669 (2006); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics 
of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999); Spencer Overton, The 
Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73 
(2004). 
 238 For illustrations of some of the Court’s major forays in this area, see 
generally McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001); Nixon v. 
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The Court returned to campaign finance laws and the 
First Amendment in the October 2005 Term in Randall v. 
Sorrell.239  At issue in Randall was Vermont’s system 
regulating both the expenditures of candidates for various 
statewide offices as well as contributions that could be made to 
those candidates.240  The candidate expenditure limits were 
highly suspect under the seminal campaign finance case 
Buckley v. Valeo.241  Not particularly surprisingly on this score, 
the Randall Court struck down the Vermont expenditure 
limits, largely on stare decisis grounds.242  Importantly, the 
Court also found that Vermont’s contribution limits were 
unconstitutional.243  It is on that aspect of the decision that I 
focus. 
In Buckley, the Court upheld the federal statute’s 
contribution limits despite recognizing that political 
contributions, as a generic matter, merit First Amendment 
protection.244  After Buckley, the Court consistently rejected 
challenges to contribution limits.245  In fact, it appears that 
before Randall, the Court had never struck down a campaign 
finance contribution limit as violative of the First 
Amendment.246 
The Court’s decision in Randall will almost certainly be 
fodder for much discussion among those commentators expert 
in election law.  I do not intend to engage in a discussion of 
what the decision may mean in that regard.  Rather, my point 
is that Randall’s rejection of Vermont’s contribution limits is 
entirely consistent with the structural equilibrium approach.247  
  
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for 
Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  
 239 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).  
 240 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2801-2810 (2002).  
 241 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54-58 (striking down candidate expenditure 
limitations in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 on First Amendment 
grounds). 
 242 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2487-91 (announcing the judgment of the Court).  
 243 See id. at 2491-500. 
 244 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-26.  
 245 See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 385-98 (2000); Cal. 
Med. Ass’n v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 195-201 (1981).  
 246 See, e.g., Posting of Amy Howe to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
movabletype/archives/2006/06/todays_opinion_11.html (June 26, 2006, 11:44 EST) 
[hereinafter Howe, Vermont Cases] (“The most significant fact about today’s decision is 
the set of reasons the Court gives for holding unconstitutional Vermont’s contribution 
limits.  Before today, the Court had never held any such limit on contributions to 
campaigns to be unconstitutional.” (quoting Richard Pildes)). 
 247 The Court’s rejection of expenditure limits is equally consistent with the 
approach in terms of preserving the vitality of the electoral process.  I focus on the 
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Having channeled other matters into the political process,248 
one can view Randall as an attempt to strengthen that process 
given the reality of modern American elections.  If money is an 
essential part of running effective political campaigns, then 
ensuring that citizens and political parties have a meaningful 
opportunity to engage in such activity is critical to the creation 
of electoral institutions themselves.249  Thus, by ensuring that 
funds will be available to make elections more competitive, 
Randall indirectly reinforces the first foundational principle 
(concerning the maintenance of independent centers of political 
authority).  Moreover, it directly supports the second 
foundational principle concerning the role of the People in the 
governing process by providing for a means of involvement in 
the process we have today. 
Finally, the way in which Randall struck down the 
contribution limits is itself instructive concerning the 
structural equilibrium approach.  The Court might have taken 
the same approach it took to expenditure limits, which, as 
described above, essentially foreclosed legislative control.  
Instead, the Court was far more measured concerning 
contribution limits.  Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion 
articulated a highly fact-dependent approach to judging the 
constitutionality of contribution limits.250  Such a ruling means 
that democratically enacted limitations on contributions may—
indeed, almost certainly will—be upheld in the future so long 
as they provide the means for effective campaigning.251  In 
short, the Court’s approach in Randall was judicially modest in 
  
contribution limits because the Court’s decision in that regard was (at least arguably) 
inconsistent with its earlier decisions.  
 248 See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing channeling certain matters into the 
federal political process in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld) and Part IV.A.2 (discussing 
channeling certain matters into the state and federal political processes in Gonzales v. 
Oregon). 
 249 Certain prominent academic commentators made a similar point shortly 
after Randall was decided.  See Howe, Vermont Cases, supra note 246 (“[T]he Court in 
this decision makes as clear as it has in any constitutional decision involving 
democratic institutions that the Court views itself as having an essential role to play in 
preserving the structural integrity of the democratic process.”). 
 250 See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2492-99 (2006).   
 251 Some of the factors Justice Breyer considered in determining that the 
Vermont contribution limits were unconstitutional were that: (1) the Vermont limits 
were so low that they had a disproportionate impact on challengers seeking to oust 
incumbents, Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2495, 2495-96; (2) the same limits applied equally to 
political parties and individuals, id. at 2496-98; (3) volunteer services (i.e., in kind 
contributions) were included in the limitations, id. at 2498-99; (4) the contribution 
limits were not inflation adjusted, id. at 2499; and (5) a lack of specific state rationales 
for the particular contribution limit set, id. at 2499-500. 
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context.  In that regard, it sufficiently guarded against judicial 
aggrandizement as is required by the first foundational 
principle. 
2. Politics and Representation:  League of United Latin 
American Citizens v. Perry 
While the Court’s decision in Randall is consistent with 
the structural equilibrium approach in terms of strengthening 
the political process, the October 2005 Term also illustrates a 
missed opportunity.  In League of United Latin American 
Citizens v. Perry,252 the Court was called upon to consider 
whether mid-decade congressional redistricting by the 
Republican-dominated Texas state government amounted to 
unconstitutional political or partisan gerrymandering.253  In a 
complex set of opinions, the Court held that it did not.254 
The notion of the political or partisan gerrymander is a 
difficult one.  As the Court recognized in Perry, for example, 
the Constitution contemplates that congressional districting 
will be accomplished through the actions of the states’ political 
branches along with the equally political federal Congress.255  
At the same time, the Court has also recognized that an effort 
“to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or 
political elements of the voting population” is unlawful.256  
Thus, the issue becomes how one determines when there is too 
much politics in an inherently political process. 
The Court has struggled with this issue.  In 1986, it 
held that partisan redistricting claims were justiciable, but was 
unable to articulate a standard by which to judge such 
claims.257  Almost two decades later, the Court returned to the 
issue in Vieth v. Jubelirer.258  In Vieth, four justices indicated 
that they would overrule Davis v. Bandemer and hold that 
claims of partisan gerrymanders were non-justiciable political 
  
 252 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).  
 253 Id. at 2604.  The case also involved allegations that certain of the districts 
drawn in the challenged process were unlawful under Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.  Id. at 2605.  The Court concluded that one of the 
districts did indeed violate the Voting Rights Act.  Id.  My discussion concerns the 
political gerrymander claim only.  
 254 Id. at 2607-12.  
 255 Id. at 2607-09.  
 256 Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (emphasis added). 
 257 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118-27 (1986). 
 258 541 U.S. 267 (2004).  
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questions.259  Justice Kennedy agreed that the claim in Vieth 
was non-justiciable, but he refused to rule out the possibility 
that a judicially manageable standard by which to judge such 
claims might be developed in the future.260   
This was the state of affairs when the Court considered 
the partisan gerrymander claims in Perry.  As one 
commentator noted immediately after the decision, Perry ended 
up as “a case that leaves us where we were.”261  In that regard, 
the Court once again—in an opinion by Justice Kennedy—
refused to rule out the possibility that some claims of partisan 
gerrymandering would be justiciable but concluded that the 
ones these plaintiffs raised were not.262 
One might say in isolation that Perry was unremarkable 
because it merely left open the door described in Vieth.263  No 
standard acceptable to the Court was yet articulated and so the 
Court did not blaze new ground or retreat from statements 
already made.  And in isolation, such a position could be 
correct.  However, in terms of the structural equilibrium 
theory, the Court should not approach such matters in isolation 
during a time of extra-constitutional change.  Rather, the Court 
should decide the case with a collective eye on the large change 
afoot. 
In order to act as an agent of structural equilibrium, the 
Court should have squarely held that claims of partisan 
gerrymandering were justiciable.264  In this way, the Court 
  
 259 Id. at 271-306 (announcing the judgment of the Court). 
 260 Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 261 Posting by Karl Blanke to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/ (June 
28, 2006 17:49 EST) (quoting Daniel H. Lowenstein, Professor of Law at University of 
California, Los Angeles).  
 262 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2607-12 
(2006).  
 263 Even seen in this light, the decision sparked critical commentary in the 
media.  See, e.g., Editorial,  A Loss for Competitive Elections, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 
2006, at A24; Editorial, Tolerating Texas Rules, WASH. POST, July 5, 2006, at A12.  The 
same can be said of some early academic reaction.  See, e.g., Post by Karl Blanke to 
SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com (June 29, 2006 16:24 EST) (“The one clear 
lesson that we should learn from LULAC [v. Perry] is that the Court has nothing to 
contribute here.” (quoting Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Associate Professor of Law at Indiana 
University, Bloomington)). 
 264 I do not address here the standard that the Court should have adopted to 
judge whether a particular gerrymander is unconstitutionally political.  For some 
academic commentary on this issue, see generally Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and 
Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751 (2004); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. 
Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 643 (1998); Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 
NOVA L. REV. 253 (2006); Jamal Greene, Note, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under 
the Elections Clause, 114 YALE L. J. 1021 (2005). 
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would have taken an important step to protect the functioning 
of the democratic process into which it would channel other 
issues more directly implicating the aggrandizement of federal 
executive power.  Such a holding would have signaled to the 
political branches that the Court would be present to correct 
any attempt to skew the representative nature of democratic 
institutions.265  It is true that the Perry Court did not totally 
foreclose a role for the judiciary in some future case.266  This 
still-open-door provides some measure of institutional check, 
but would be entirely too weak for a Court taking seriously its 
responsibility to protect the foundational principles in a time of 
extra-constitutional change. 
C. Protecting Dissenters and the Press 
As described above, the three sub-attributes of the 
Bushian vision of executive authority are a commitment to 
secrecy, an intolerance of questioning, and a pattern of 
retribution against critics.267  A court acting as an agent of 
structural equilibrium would need to consider these attributes 
as well as the more obvious characteristics of an extra-
constitutional change.  Thus, when confronted with matters 
touching on the rights of and protections for dissenters, as well 
as those implicating the freedom of the press, the judiciary 
should consider the impact of such decisions on the larger, 
changing constitutional order.  Judged on this basis, the 
Supreme Court fell woefully short in the October 2005 Term.  
In this sub-part, I separately address how this is so with 
respect to both dissenters and the press. 
1. Dissenters 
Because central parts of the Bush Administration’s 
conception of executive authority concern an aversion to 
questioning and retribution against questioners, a court should 
craft rules designed to encourage dissent and protect 
dissenters.268  The Supreme Court failed to do so in the October 
  
 265 Such a step would have been even more important if one accepts the 
arguments of Professors Levinson and Pildes concerning the importance of politically 
divided government.  See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 61, at 2322, 2327-28.  
 266 Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2607, 2612. 
 267 See supra Part III.B.  
 268 As the editorial page of the New York Times recently noted, Congress 
should also take such steps.  See Editorial, Save the Endangered Whistle-Blower, N.Y. 
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2005 Term in two important respects, one concerning 
government employees and the other dealing with ordinary 
citizens.  To be an effective agent of structural equilibrium in 
the current climate, the Court would need to act substantially 
differently in this regard. 
The first example of the Court’s failing is Garcetti v. 
Ceballos.269  Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney for 
Los Angeles County, California.270  During 2000, Ceballos 
became convinced that an affidavit executed by a Los Angeles 
County Deputy Sheriff in support of a search warrant 
contained false information.271  Ceballos raised his concerns in a 
number of ways within the District Attorney’s office.272  His 
recommendation that the prosecution be dismissed was 
eventually rejected.273 
Ceballos later claimed that after he raised concerns 
about the affidavit, his supervisors retaliated against him in a 
variety of ways.274  Thereafter, he filed a lawsuit against the 
District Attorney and others, claiming that his First 
Amendment rights had been violated as a result of the alleged 
retaliation.275  At the Supreme Court the central issue was 
whether a public employee could state a First Amendment 
retaliation claim for speech made pursuant to his or her job 
duties.276  The Court concluded that “when public employees 
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”277 
Whatever could be said in support of the Court’s 
conclusion in Ceballos, it is not consistent with providing a 
check on an executive authority that both resists questions and 
is prone to retaliate against those who do not toe the official 
  
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2006, at A14 (“If ever government whistle-blowers needed protection 
from official retaliation it is now, in the secrecy-obsessed Bush administration.  Federal 
employees daring to disclose fraud and abuse in their bureaucracies have been under 
virtual siege, isolated as pariahs and shipped off under gag orders to lesser jobs in far-
off places.”).  
 269 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).  
 270 Id. at 1955.  
 271 Id. at 1955-56.  
 272 Id.  
 273 Id. at 1956.  
 274 Id. 
 275 Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1956. 
 276 Id. at 1959-60. 
 277 Id. at 1960.  
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line.  By decreasing the protection afforded to such government 
employees, the Court actually reinforces these characteristics 
of executive authority.  With employees less able to confidently 
speak their minds, the executive will likely to be more prone to 
engage in retaliation for questioning. 
Of course, the positive attributes of questioning 
government action are not restricted to public employees.  
Citizens also provide benefits, especially in a time of increased 
government secrecy and resistance to criticism.  But ordinary 
citizens are also subject to retaliation for speaking out in the 
Bushian conception of executive authority.278  Accordingly, a 
court acting as an agent of structural equilibrium should act to 
protect citizens’ rights to speak out without fear of retribution. 
The Court faced a case in the October 2005 Term in 
which it missed an opportunity to act in such a fashion.  At 
issue in Hartman v. Moore279 was a claim that the plaintiff, 
William Moore, was the subject of a criminal prosecution in 
retaliation for certain public positions he took.280  The narrow 
doctrinal issue in Hartman was “whether the complaint states 
an actionable violation of the First Amendment without 
alleging an absence of probable cause to support the underlying 
criminal charge.”281  The Court held that a plaintiff was 
required to plead and prove the absence of probable cause.282 
One can defend Hartman on the central practical 
ground the Court discusses, namely the difficulty of proof of 
causation when there is both a retaliatory motive and probable 
cause.283  Mixed motive situations are always difficult.  
Nevertheless, a court acting as an agent of structural 
  
 278 See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing in part retaliatory actions against non-
governmental actors).  
 279 126 S. Ct. 1695 (2006).  
 280 Moore was the owner of a business that manufactured equipment used to 
automatically read multiple lines of text.  Id. at 1699.  This technology was one way in 
which mail could be sorted electronically.  Id.  Another possibility was to have 
sufficient information included on a single line of text (for example, using the nine digit 
zip code).  Id.  Moore aggressively lobbied Congress to reject the Postal Service’s 
preferred single line approach in favor of the multiple line technology in which he 
specialized.  Id.  After agreeing to use the multiple line approach, the Postal Service 
awarded the contract to another bidder.  Id. at 1699-700.  Thereafter, Moore alleged 
that Postal Inspectors successfully pressured an Assistant United States Attorney to 
indict Moore on trumped up criminal charges related to his successful lobbying efforts.  
Id. at 1700.  The judge dismissed the charges during trial and the civil rights lawsuit 
followed.  Id. 
 281 Id. at 1699.  
 282 Id. at 1707.  
 283 See id. at 1702-07.  
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equilibrium should not focus on such work-a-day matters.  
Instead, it should focus on the overall structural integrity of 
the constitutional system.  Seen in this light, Hartman is a 
dangerous decision because, in its admittedly small way, it 
makes retaliation against citizens who speak out more likely by 
increasing the practical burden on those citizens of mounting 
an effective legal challenge to the retaliatory action. 
2. The Press 
The Bush administration’s resistance to questioning and 
penchant for secrecy also implicates the way in which a court 
faced with an extra-constitutional change with such attributes 
should approach matters concerning the press.  When an extra-
constitutional change restricts the flow of information, all the 
foundational principles are threatened.  Other institutions of 
government, as well as ordinary citizens, are deprived of the 
tools to play their role in the system.  The end result is a less 
efficient government in the long run.  Accordingly, when 
secrecy is the order of the day, democracy comes to depend on 
the press as a tool by which information can be supplied to 
relevant institutions.284  But as with dissenters, the Supreme 
Court did not fare well in matters involving the press under the 
structural equilibrium approach in the October 2005 Term. 
In June 2006, the Court denied certiorari in two cases 
related to litigation commenced by Wen Ho Lee against various 
government officials.285  Mr. Lee was a scientist employed by 
the Department of Energy.286  In the mid-1990s, he came under 
suspicion for espionage.287  He was ultimately indicted not for 
that offense, but rather for mishandling classified computer 
  
 284 Professor Deborah Pearlstein recently made a similar point concerning the 
importance of the press in a civil society.  See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective 
Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 
1255, 1279-84 (2006).  See also Editorial, An Absence of Trust that Needs Healing, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, June 29, 2006, at 12A (“In general, history teaches that democracy 
is better served by a free press informing citizens about their government than by 
secrecy.”).  
 285 See generally Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006); Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2373 (2006). 
 286 See Lee, 413 F.3d at 55.  
 287 Id.  
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files.288  He pled guilty to one such count while fifty-eight other 
counts were dismissed.289 
After his guilty plea, Mr. Lee filed suit under the federal 
Privacy Act claiming that certain government officials had 
unlawfully disclosed his identity and other information to the 
news media during the investigation.290  In connection with 
those claims, Lee subpoenaed several journalists seeking 
information concerning the identity of the government officials 
who provided such information.291  The subpoenaed journalists 
refused to testify, were held in contempt, and appealed those 
contempt citations to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit.292 
The central legal issue in the cases concerned the 
existence and scope of a constitutional or common law privilege 
protecting journalists from disclosing their confidential 
sources.293  The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s 
order.294  The petitions for writs of certiorari followed.295 
The journalists’ privilege is a highly controversial 
issue.296  As the circuit court noted in Lee when discussing the 
potential constitutional issue, “[n]ot only the breadth of this 
claimed privilege, but its very existence has long been the 
subject of substantial controversy.”297  Such uncertainty, even 
about a matter going to the freedom of the press in American 
society, might be acceptable in times of stable constitutional 
meaning.  However, when the existing constitutional order is 
threatened by an actual or potential constitutional change with 
characteristics such as those of our current time, uncertainty 
  
 288 Id.  
 289 Id.  
 290 Id. at 55-56. 
 291 Id. at 56.  
 292 Lee, 413 F.3d at 56-57.  
 293 See id. at 57.  
 294 Id. at 64.  
 295 See supra note 285.  
 296 For a sampling of recent academic commentary on the issue, see generally 
Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal 
Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection 
for Sources and Information, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97 (2002); Linda L. Berger, 
Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect the Journalist’s 
Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1371 (2003); Anthony 
L. Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists, and 
the Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1063 (2006); Geoffrey R. Stone, Why We Need a Federal Reporter’s Privilege, 34 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 39 (2005). 
 297 Lee, 413 F.3d at 57.  
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about core protections for the news media can no longer be 
tolerated.  Instead, acting as an agent of structural 
equilibrium, a court should resolve such uncertainty in a 
manner that most aggressively protects the role of the press to 
strengthen the foundational principles.  The Court missed such 
an opportunity when it declined to consider the appeals in Lee 
raising the constitutional or common law pedigree of the 
journalists’ privilege. 
V. CONCLUSION AND A GLIMPSE OF THE ROAD AHEAD 
Times change and so does the Constitution.  When 
constitutional change is formalized through an Article V 
amendment, courts have a constitutional duty to enforce the 
new constitutional structure or other rule in conformity with 
the amendment.  When the change is an extra-constitutional 
one, however, courts must ensure that they protect the three 
foundational principles on which the original constitutional 
architecture is based.   
I have explained the central attributes of the potential 
constitutional change advocated by the Bush administration.  
It is wide-ranging and potentially quite dangerous to American 
fundamental constitutional values.  My goal has been to 
develop the operation of the structural equilibrium theory with 
the Bushian model as an example. I did so using the Supreme 
Court’s October 2005 Term.  As discussed above, with the 
structural equilibrium model as a baseline, the Court did well 
as to some matters but was deficient with respect to others. 
This effort addressing how the structural equilibrium 
approach would have operated is important in its own right.  
Without doing so, one would not be in as good a position to 
evaluate the merits of the approach I advocate.  However, the 
true significance of the approach is forward-looking.  I hope 
that the Court consciously acts on the approach I have 
suggested here, because the challenges most certainly continue 
in the future.  How will the Court rule on cases raising the 
continued viability of the “state secrets” privilege?298  What will 
  
 298 A number of lawsuits were filed around the country challenging the 
administration’s warrantless wiretapping and data-mining surveillance programs.  See, 
e.g., ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Service, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 
2006); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Terkel v. AT&T, 
Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Cent. for Const. Rights v. Bush, No. 06-CV-
00313 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 2006).  The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
consolidated many of these cases for pre-trial proceedings in the Central District of 
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the Court decide concerning executive preemption in a case it 
heard during the October 2006 Term?299  And what will the 
Court do when it next confronts the applicability of the 
Chevron doctrine in the context of aggressive administrative 
agency actions?300  Each of these issues implicates core 
elements of the proposed new constitutional order.  In each 
case, the Court will need to decide how to synthesize the new 
with the old.  When it does so, it should consciously act as an 
agent of constitutional structural equilibrium to preserve the 
foundational principles in the most effective way possible.   
In sum, as Professor Ackerman recently wrote 
considering executive power and terrorism, “[o]ur great 
constitutional tradition of checks and balances provides the 
material we need to withstand the tragic attacks and 
predictable panics of the twenty-first century.”301  They also 
provide the material to weather the more general storm of 
extra-constitutional change, whether it is instigated by 
Democrats or by Republicans.  Now, the Court needs to act on 
that constitutional tradition. 
  
California.  See also Transfer Order, In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 
MDL No. 1791 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.jpml. 
uscourts.gov/pending_MDLs/Miscellaneous/MDL-1791/MDL-1791-TransferOrder.pdf.  
The possibility of Supreme Court intervention was increased in this area because the 
district courts to consider the state secrets privilege (i.e., the claim that a lawsuit 
should be dismissed because mounting a defense would require disclosing confidential 
information) have split on the issue.  See, e.g., ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 758-66 
(rejecting the privilege for the warrantless wiretapping claim but accepting it for the 
data-mining claim); Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 998-99 (rejecting privilege in 
connection with warrantless wiretapping claim); Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 909-10 
(accepting privilege in connection with warrantless wiretapping claim).  Of course, all 
bets may be off if Congress enacts Senate Bill No. 2453, entitled the National Security 
Surveillance Act of 2006, that would, in part, consolidate all such litigation in the 
secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. See National Security Surveillance Act 
of 2006, S. 2453, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006). 
 299 See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 431 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted, 126 S. Ct. 2900 (2006).  The issue in the case concerned the scope of the 
authority of the Comptroller of the Currency to preempt certain state laws regulating 
subsidiaries of national banks.  See id. 
 300 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  Issues concerning Chevron and administrative agencies have received 
increased scholarly attention of late as administrative agencies have taken more 
aggressive policy positions.  See, e.g., Kinkopf, supra note 45, at 1176-95; Levinson & 
Pildes, supra note 61, at 2360-64; Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency 
Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013 (2005); Kevin M. Stack, The 
President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron, Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). 
 301 ACKERMAN, NEXT ATTACK, supra note 18, at 9. 
